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CHAPTER 1  :  INTRODUCTION 
The person most affected by many family law matters, whether in divorce or other 
parental rights and responsibility disputes is the child. But the child was traditionally not 
given an opportunity to be heard or raise an opinion. Under English Common law, the child 
was considered a movable article of personal property and was used for bartering and 
negotiating.
1
   
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (the CRC) ushered in a new era in 
children’s rights. Article 12 was an innovation with regard to child participation and hearing 
the children’s voice in matters that affect them. A general practice has appeared in recent 
years, which has been broadly conceptualized as “participation”, although this term itself 
does not appear in the text of article 12.
2
 The Committee on the Rights of the Child
3
 have 
formulated a helpful definition of the concept of “participation” as it has evolved over the 
years. The term can be described as: 
 ‘[The] ongoing processes, which include information-sharing and dialogue between 
children and adults based on mutual respect, and in which children can learn how 
their views and those of adults are taken into account and shape the outcome of such 
processes.’4 
The Children’s Act incorporates into South African law the international recognition of a 
child’s right to participate. Section 10 of the Children’s Act expressly gives children the right 
to express their views in an appropriate manner in any matter which concerns the child. The 
                                                            
1 Eitzen T (1986) ‘A Child’s Right to Independent Legal Representation in a Custody Dispute: A Unique Legal 
Situation, A Necessary Broad Standard, The Child’s Constitutional Rights, The Role of the Attorney Whose 
Client is the Child’, 19 Family Law Quarterly 58.  
2 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 12 (2009) -  The right of the child to be heard, 5 
(hereafter General Comment No. 12(2009)). 
3 This is the monitoring body of the CRC established in terms of Article 43 thereof. 
4 ‘Every Child’s Right to be Heard’: Resource Guide to General Comment No. 12, G. Lansdown (2005), 
UNICEF Innocenti Research Center (ISBN: 88-89129-15-8) 11 available from www.unicef.org/rc (last accessed 
5 August 2013) (hereinafter Resource Guide to General Comment No. 12). 
 
 
 
 
2 
most common family law matter that is litigated in South Africa and that will inevitably have 
a profound effect on a child’s life is care and contact disputes.5 Although such decisions will 
have a major impact on their lives, children are usually not parties to such proceedings, even 
if the child holds a strong view about his or her preference. Despite the Constitutional Court 
recognising children’s right to participate in proceedings that affect them6, this right is not 
always realised in practice.  
South Africa adheres to the best interest principle. This principle was adopted into the 
South African Constitution
7
, is reinforced in section 9 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 and 
South Africa is a state party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child which all place the best-interest principle in 
high regard.
8
 It is therefore essential that children’s best interest be realised in all matters 
affecting them and that they be given an opportunity to share their views and it be given due 
weight when determining their best interests. This paper will explore how children’s right to 
be heard, specifically in family law matters, is being implemented in South Africa and 
whether existing legislation, measures and practices are adequate to realise children’s rights 
and in keeping with the best-interest principle.  
In the light of the above, this thesis seeks to explore how children’s right to be heard, 
specifically in family law matters, is being implemented in South Africa and whether existing 
                                                            
5 The Children’s Act replaced the traditional terminology of “custody” and “access” with “care” and “contact”. 
See WW v EW 2011 (6) SA 53 (KZP). 
6 AD and Another v DW and Others (Center for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2008 (3) 184 (CC) para 38; Bhe 
and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others (Commission of Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae) 2005 (1) 
SA 580 (CC) para 55; Bannatyne v Bannatyne 2003 (2) SA 363 (CC) 375 H-J; Du Toit and Another v Minister 
of Welfare and Population Development and Another (Gay and Lesbian Equality Project as Amicus Curiae) 
2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) para 21; Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and 
Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) para 75.  
7 Section 28(2) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. 
8 Article 3 of the CRC states the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. Similarly,  Article 4 
(1) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child states that best interests of the child shall be 
the primary consideration. 
 
 
 
 
3 
legislation, practices and procedures are adequate to ensure that children are given an 
opportunity to express their views and have those be given due weight. A brief overview of 
the structure of this work is presented below. 
In Chapter 2 the main focus will be an examination of Article 12 of the CRC and 
Article 4 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. The relationship 
between Article 12 and other provisions of the CRC will also be explored. The similarities 
and contrast between these two instruments will be explored by way of comparison. The 
international legal history which culminated in the adoption of a provision such as article 12 
will also be included at the outset.  
Chapter 3 will explore whether current legislation is sufficient to guarantee that 
children’s voices will be heard in matters that affect them. The chapter will examine previous 
legislation to conclude whether provisions in the current Children’s Act are sufficient to 
ensure that children’s voices are heard in judicial proceedings. The chapter will also look at 
the different forums in which children may need to be legally represented and what 
provisions are in place to ensure such legal representation. The chapter will also look at 
certain mechanisms that the legislature has provided to ensure that a child’s right to access to 
courts is realised. 
Chapter 4 will consider whether current procedures are sufficient to guarantee that 
children’s voices will be heard in matters that affect them. The methods of participation 
which will be assessed, include, the appointment of a separate legal representative for the 
child, the appointment of a curator ad litem, relying on family advocate reports and 
recommendations, expert evidence and reports or judicial interviews. Case law will be 
analysed with specific reference to the method used to bring the child’s view before the court. 
 
 
 
 
4 
The procedures available in South Africa will be compared to those available in Australia to 
determine whether there are any lessons that South Africa can learn from that jurisdiction.   
Finally, chapter 5 concludes this work with recommendations relating to a proposed 
team approach in family law matters. 
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CHAPTER 2  :  THE RIGHT OF A CHILD TO BE HEARD IN INTERNATIONAL 
AND REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this chapter is the detailed examination of Article 12 of the CRC and 
Article 4 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare if the Child (the Charter). An 
exploration of the relationship between Article 12 and various articles of the CRC will follow 
a legal analysis of Article 12 of the CRC. A comparison between Article 12 of the CRC and 
Article 4 of the Charter will also be included. A brief exploration of the international legal 
history of children’s rights instruments and a child’s right to be heard will also be discussed 
at the outset. 
2. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL HISTORY 
The first international document recognising the special status of children was the 1924 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child (“the 1924 Declaration”), adopted by the Fifth 
Assembly of the League of Nations. Even though this document had several major limitations 
and did not contain a right of the child to be heard, it laid the foundation for the international 
movement for children’s rights. The 1924 Declaration focussed on children’s “care and 
protection” rights, providing that the child must be ‘fed’, ‘nursed’, ‘reclaimed’, ‘sheltered’, 
and ‘succored’. The 1924 Declaration was a document of ‘moral and political nature’ and 
was not considered legally binding.
9
  
On 20 November 1959 the United Nations adopted the Declaration of the Rights of the 
Child (“the 1959 Declaration”). The 1959 Declaration in effect encompassed all the rights set 
                                                            
9 Spitz LM (2005), ‘Implementing the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child: Children’s Rights Under the 
1996 South African Constitution’, 38 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 856. 
 
 
 
 
6 
forth in the 1924 Declaration and expanded on the rights that children enjoy and how they 
were to be guaranteed. The 1959 Declaration directed ‘parents…men and women as 
individuals, and … voluntary organizations, local authorities and national Governments’10 to 
recognise the rights included therein and to strive for their observance. The welfare of 
children had traditionally been considered the responsibility of the family but with the advent 
of the 1959 Declaration this responsibility was also shifted to the community and the State.
11
  
A further significant contribution that the 1959 Declaration made to the international child 
law platform was that unlike the 1924 Declaration which used the language ‘[t]he child must 
be given…’, the 1959 Declaration framed rights in the following form, ‘[t]he child shall 
enjoy…’ . The change in language illustrates that children were no longer regarded as objects 
of international law but as rights-bearing subjects of international law.
12
 Despite these 
advances, the 1959 Declaration did not include a provision which provided for the 
consideration of the child’s views nor a right to freedom of expression. The 1959 Declaration, 
like the 1924 Declaration, was not a legally binding international instrument.  
In 1978 Poland proposed that the rights of the child should be enshrined in a 
Convention, the Polish representatives attached a draft of such a Convention to this proposal. 
The draft was merely a reformulated version of the 1959 Declaration and consequently 
included no provisions on the right of the child to be heard.
13
 It is only when Poland 
submitted its revised version in 1979 that it included an Article 7, which eventually became 
the current Article 12. Article 7 gave children the right to express an opinion ‘in matters 
concerning his own person’ and enumerated a list of matters to which this right would apply, 
namely, marriage, choice of occupation, medical treatment, education and recreation. This 
                                                            
10 Preamble of the 1959 Declaration. 
11 Spitz (2005) 858. 
12 Spitz (2005) 859. 
13 Krappmann L (2010) ‘The Weight of the child’s view (Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the                                   
Child)’ 18 International Journal of Children’s Rights 503. 
 
 
 
 
7 
formulation was seen as being too broad and was replaced by the phrase ‘all matters affecting 
the child’. Further proposals to narrow the scope by referring to ‘all matters affecting the 
rights of the child’ were rejected. The difference seems subtle but the present formulation 
does provide for comprehensive protection of not only rights but daily needs of the child.
14
 
By 1982 an open ended working group was established by the Commission on Human 
Rights to facilitate the completion of the Convention. The final version of the Convention 
was a result of ‘a series of complex negotiations and compromises among government 
delegations which often had conflicting social, political, legal, economic and religious 
orientations.’15 The Convention on the Rights of the Child has now almost been universally 
ratified, with only the United State of America and Somalia that have not done so.  
3. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 
3.1 Article 12 of the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child 
Article 12 of the CRC provides: 
‘1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views 
the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the 
child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. 
2. For this purpose the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard 
in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or 
through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the 
procedural rules of national law.’ 
                                                            
14 Krappman (2010) 503-504. 
15 see Mahery P (2009) ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Maintaining its Value in 
International and South African Child Law’ in Boezaart T (ed) Child Law in South Africa Juta & Co, Ltd: Cape 
Town 331. 
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The right of all children to be heard and taken seriously by decision-makers is a unique 
provision in a human rights treaty. Article 12 speaks to the legal and social status of children, 
who, on the one hand lack full autonomy of adults but, on the other, are subjects of rights.
16
 
Article 12 of the Convention establishes the right of every child to freely express her or his 
views, in all matters affecting her or him, and the ‘subsequent right’ for those views to be 
given due weight, according to the child’s age and maturity.17 
The inclusion of Article 12 in the CRC is a departure from the long-standing view that 
children are incompetent, lack responsibility, are in need of protection and therefore, still in a 
phase of preparation for life – ‘in short: The child is an incomplete human being.’18 
Children’s right to be heard was a new concept in international law and posed a challenge to 
the mind-sets held in many countries and communities throughout the world. However, over 
the past 20 years, many governments, alongside civil society organisations, have begun to 
come to terms with the implications of this new obligation to recognise children as citizens, 
as participants and as active contributors to decisions in their own lives. Introducing the 
necessary measures to fulfil the responsibility has been a challenge for many governments 
and there seems to be a lack of understanding among governments as to what it means to 
listen to children.
19
  
The rights contained in the CRC are usually categorized according to the 3 “Ps” 
which are: 
Provision: The right to provision of basic needs, such as right to education, the 
highest attainable standard of health. 
Protection: The right to protection from harmful act and practices. 
                                                            
16 General Comment No. 12(2009) 5. 
17 General Comment No. 12 (2009) 8. 
18 Krappmann L (2010) 502. 
19 Resource Guide to General Comment No. 12. 
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Participation: The right to participate in decisions that affect their lives.
20
 
Of further importance are the four general principles in the CRC which are 
fundamental to the implementation of the entire CRC. The Committee on the Rights of the 
Child have the four principles as; non-discrimination (Article 2), the best interests of the child 
(Article 3), the right to life, survival and development (Article 6) and respect for the views of 
the child (Article 12).
21
  
It has been argued that the right to be heard is capable of immediate implementation 
and direct application as it not of a general nature with vague outline and it is a provision 
described in sufficient detail.
22
 The fact that the Committee has identified the right to be 
heard as one of the fundamental values of the CRC, means that this article establishes not 
only a right in itself, but should also be considered in the interpretation and implementation 
of all other rights.
23
 Participation can be seen as a substantive right as children have the right 
as a matter of principle to be listened to and taken seriously. Participation can also be 
described as a procedural right through which children can act to protect and promote the 
realisation of other rights.
24
 Participation is thus conceptualised in the CRC as ‘a procedural 
right through which children can act to protect and promote the realisation of other rights’.25   
 
                                                            
20 For a full discussion on the three “Ps” see Mahery P (2009). See also Lurie J (2004) ‘The Tension Between 
Protection and Participation – general Theory and Consequences as related to rights of Children, Including 
Working Children’  Inter-University Centre Journal of Social Work Theory and Practice 7.7. 
21 For a full discussion of the general principles see Mahery (2009). 
22 Lűcker-Babel M (1995) ‘The Right of the child to express views and to be heard: An attempt to interpret 
Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child’ 3 International Journal of Children’s Rights 395.  
23 The other fundamental values include, the right to non-discrimination, the right to life and development, and 
the primary consideration of the child’s best interests. 
24 Lansdown (2005) 17. Participation is indeed an entrenched concept in international law. The General 
Assembly of the UN in their resolution adopted at the 27th Special Session implored State Parties to join in a 
global movement that will help to build a world fit for children by upholding the commitment to listen to 
children and ensure their participation. It resolved that, “[c]hildren and adolescents are resourceful citizens 
capable of helping to build a better future for all. We must respect their right to express themselves and to 
participate in all matters affecting them, in accordance with their age and maturity.” See UN General Assembly, 
A World Fit for Children, A/RES/S-27/2, 11 October 2002. 
25 Resource Guide to General Comment No. 12, 17. 
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A. Paragraph 1 of Article 12 
i “Shall assure” 
‘Shall assure’ refers to the obligation on the State to provide an opportunity to the 
child to freely express their view. There is no scope within this to exercise discretion as State 
Parties are under a strict obligation to implement this right by the adoption of appropriate 
measures.
26
 Specifically, with regard to legal proceedings Kassan suggests that judicial 
proceedings should be adapted  and can include making the physical design of the court more 
child-friendly, for example, having separate waiting rooms for children, the video-taping of 
evidence and sight screens to enable children to participate.
27
 The obligation on the State 
includes ensuring mechanisms are in place to encourage children to share their views on all 
matters affecting them, but also that those views be given due weight.
28
  
Under no circumstances should the child be forced or pressurised to express a view. 
There is no obligation on the child to express his or her view. The child has the choice to do 
so or not. The only obligation encompassed in the phrase ‘shall assure’ is the obligation on 
the State to provide the opportunity for a child to be heard or participate, if he or she chooses 
to. 
ii “Capable of forming his or her own views” 
In formulating the CRC, the drafters first referred to the “age of reason”. It is 
fortunate that this ambiguous phrase was deleted in favour of “the child who is capable of 
forming an own view”.29 The Committee on the Rights of the Child points out that this aspect 
should not operate as a limitation on the exercise of the right to be heard by some children or 
                                                            
26 General Comment No.12 (2009) 8. 
27 Kassan D, How can the voice of the child be adequately heard in family law proceedings, LLM Minithesis, 
unpublished, UWC, 2004 8. 
28 General Comment No. 12 (2009) 8.  
29 Krappmann (2010) 504. 
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groups of children. There should therefore be no exclusion of children because they have not 
reached a specific age. The Committee implores States not to introduce age limits, either in 
law or in practice, on the right of the child to express his or her views. The phrase places an 
obligation on the State to assess the capacity of the child to form an autonomous opinion to 
the greatest extent possible.
30
  
The departure point should be that the child is not under a duty to prove his or her 
capacity. On the contrary, the Committee emphasises that there is a presumption that a child 
has the capacity to form her or his own views and that States should recognize that he or she 
has the right to express them.
31
 Children of younger ages or children who experience 
difficulty in making their views heard, for example children with disabilities, also have a 
right to express their views and States have to foster sensitivity to the ways children 
communicate.
32
 ‘Article 12 requires recognition of and respect for, non-verbal forms of 
communication including play, body language, facial expressions, and drawing and painting, 
through which very young children demonstrate understanding, choices and preferences.’33 
The Committee clearly states that it is not necessary that the child has full knowledge 
of all aspects of the matter affecting her or him, but that he or she has sufficient grasp of the 
situation to be capable of appropriately forming her or his own views on the matter.
34
 This 
implies that we should first verify if the child is in a position to have an idea on the issue in 
question but not necessarily on the whole spectrum of problems facing him or her. After a 
separation of the parents, for instance, it is possible for  children to have a considered opinion 
                                                            
30 General Comment No. 12(2009) 9. 
31 General Comment No. 12 (2009) 9. 
32 Krappmann (2010) 507. 
33 General Comment No.12 (2009) 9. 
34 General Comment No.12 (2009) 9. 
 
 
 
 
12 
on their own situation and possibly their own future, when they understand, in their child-like 
way, what the issue is about and what is at stake.
35
   
iii “The right to express those views freely” 
‘Freely’ once again points to the choice that the child has to express his or her view. 
The free choice that the child is given entails that his or her views must be shared without any 
pressure on him or her to share and the child must not be subjected to any undue influence or 
be manipulated in any way. Lűcker-Babel correctly points out that ‘[t]he absence of freedom, 
which by definition interferes with the child’s opinion and renders the application of Article 
12 impossible.’36An essential element of ‘freely’ is that the child should share his or her own 
perspective on the matter and not the views of others. 
State Parties are under an obligation to ensure conditions that take account of the 
individual child’s social situation and make efforts to create an environment wherein the 
child feels respected and secure enough to freely express his or her own views. To ensure that 
a child’s right to be heard is effectively realised, the child must be informed about matters, 
options and possible decisions to be taken and the consequences of the possible decisions. 
This obligation falls on those responsible for hearing the child’s views (for example social 
workers, judges or legal representatives) and by parents or guardians. The right to 
information also entails that the child be informed beforehand that he or she has a right to 
share his or her views and be informed of the procedure or the conditions under which he or 
she will be asked to express his or her views.
37
 Ignorance of what to expect or what rights he 
or she is entitled to may lead to undue stress and trauma for the child. If the child is not 
                                                            
35 Lűcker-Babel M (1995) 397. 
36 Lűcker-Babel (1995) 399. 
37 General Comment No.12 (2009) 10. 
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provided with all the relevant information, it cannot be expected of the child to make an 
informed decision.  
Undue influence on the child will in all likelihood lead to the child’s views not being 
taken into account. The Committee has, in fact, pointed out that ‘judges should not consider 
the child’s opinion if he finds out that the child expresses an opinion influenced by the 
position of one of his or her parents, or that circumstances under which the opinion is 
expressed are not favourable to free expression (stress, fear, inhibition of the child).’38  
It must be emphasised that Article 12(2) only requires that the child’s opinion be 
considered. It does not command that the child’s expressed view must be implemented. The 
child’s right to be heard therefore does not imply that the child will replace the adult in the 
decision-making process. The adult remains responsible to make the decision. Free choice of 
the child does not entitle the adult decision-maker to passively accept the child’s choice. The 
right as contained in Article 12 consists of the child communicating an opinion or even a 
wish, not the right to be the decision-maker.
39
 
iv  “In all matters affecting the child” 
This phrase is the basic condition that must be respected and embodies the second 
qualification of the right to be heard. The child has the right to be heard if the specific matter 
or issue to be decided affects them. It is also argued that Article 12 seems to have a more 
limited effect and should be applied in situations that ‘concretely affect a specific child.’40 
The Committee, however, has indicated that this qualification should be understood broadly 
and ‘matters’ also covers issues not specifically mentioned in the CRC. It often happens that 
children who are capable of expressing their own views are denied the right to be heard in 
                                                            
38 General Comment No.12 (2009) 10. 
39 Lűcker-Babel (1995) 399. 
40 Lűcker-Babel (1995) 396. 
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matters that obviously affect them. This troubling situation has been identified by the 
Committee, who have urged States Parties to listen to children’s views wherever their 
perspective can enhance the quality of solutions.
41
 
v  “Being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child” 
This clause in essence refers to the capacity of the child. The capacity of the child to 
form views and to express them will have a direct effect on the weight that the court attaches 
to the child views. Article 12 requires more than just giving the child who is capable of 
forming a view the opportunity to express his or her views,  the child’s views have to be 
seriously considered when the child is capable of forming her or his own views.
42
 
Article 12 makes it clear that age is not the determining factor with regard to the 
weight that should be attached to the child’s views. Research confirms that information, 
experience, environment, social and cultural expectations, and levels of support all contribute 
to the development of a child’s capacities to form a view. Chronological age does not 
necessarily determine a child’s level of understanding. Maturity is difficult to define but in 
the framework of Article 12, it is the capacity of a child to express her or his views on issues 
in a reasonable and independent manner. It has been pointed out that the greater the impact of 
the outcome on the child’s life, the more relevant the proper assessment of the maturity of the 
child is. Children’s capacity, therefore, has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.43 
Lűcker-Babel points out that this phrase contains both an objective element and a 
subjective element. ‘Once the capacity of discernment is established, the view expressed by 
the child will be examined not only in the context of what has been said but also according to 
                                                            
41 General Comment No.12 (2009) 10. 
42 General Comment No.12 (2009) 11. 
43 General Comment No.12 (2009) 11. 
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the child’s age (objective element) and degree of maturity (subjective element).’44 Mahery 
correctly argues that even though age and maturity determines the weight to be attached to 
the views of the child it does not undermine the right of the capable child to express his or her 
views freely.
45
  
In the CRC structure, the best interest of the child (Article 3) does not necessarily 
constitute the preeminent factor in coming to a decision.
 46
 Similarly, the views of the child 
will not be the determinative factor. The degree of weight that the child’s views will carry 
will take into account factors such as, the nature of the problem, the degree of the interest it 
represents to the child and other justified interests (those of parents, siblings, the 
surroundings, the institution etc.). It has been pointed out that the greater consequences of the 
decision on the child, the more the child’s opinion deserve important consideration.47 
B. Paragraph 2 of Article 12 
i The right “to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the 
child” 
Article 12(2) specifically emphasises that a child must be given the opportunity to be 
heard in ‘any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child’. The application of 
article 12(2) is broad and includes all judicial proceedings affecting the child, without 
limitation, for example, separation of parents, custody and care disputes, adoption, children in 
conflict with the law, child victims of physical or psychological violence, sexual abuse or 
other crimes, health care, social security, unaccompanied children, asylum-seeking and 
refugee children, and victims of armed conflict and other emergencies. Administrative 
                                                            
44 Lűcker-Babel (1995) 399. 
45 Mahery (2009) 322.  
46 The CRC makes some exceptions. For example Article 21 relates to adoption and it provides that the best 
interest of the child shall be the paramount consideration.  
47 Lűcker-Babel (1995) 399. 
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proceedings include, for example, decisions about children’s education, health, environment 
or living conditions.  
The terms ‘proceedings’ includes matters that are initiated by the child, for example 
cases of abuse, and matters where the child  is in a secondary position, such as parental 
separation and adoption.
48
 The Committee points out that  proceedings must be accessible 
and child-appropriate. A child cannot be heard effectively where the environment is 
intimidating, hostile, insensitive or inappropriate for her or his age.
49
 
ii “Either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body” 
Skelton and Davel argue that the CRC caters for two manners in which a child can 
express his or her view, namely through participation or representation. Participation would 
refer any procedure that allows the child to be heard directly, without an intermediary. These 
procedures would include children being consulted about their views and preferences or 
children becoming parties to the legal proceedings and thus being able to request specific 
remedies or relief. Representation, on the other hand, refers to procedures where the child 
would have some kind of adult representation in legal proceedings.
50
 
A child who has indicated that he or she wishes to share his or her views on a matter, 
has the option of choosing the manner in which those views may be shared. The Committee 
is in favour of children being heard directly and recommends that, wherever possible, the 
child must be given this opportunity. The child must also have the opportunity to deliver 
input on the method chosen. If a representative for the child is to be appointed, it is crucial 
that the views of the child be transmitted correctly to the decision-maker by the 
                                                            
48 The Committee goes further and urges State parties ‘to introduce legislative measures requiring decision 
makers in judicial or administrative proceedings to explain the extent of the consideration given to the views of 
the child and the consequences for the child.’ General Comment No.12 (2009) 11. 
49 General Comment No.12 (2009) 11. See also Lűcker-Babel (1995) 401. 
50 Davel C & Skelton A (2007) Commentary on the Children’s Act Juta: Cape Town 2-13. 
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representative.
51
 The Committee, however, points out that there is a risk of conflict of interest 
between the child and their parent, where the parent acts as their representative. The 
representative must at all times be aware that he or she represents the interests of the child 
and not the interests of other persons (be it parents, institutions or other bodies). 
52
 
iii “In a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law” 
This clause entails that rules of procedure must be adhered to and non-compliance 
may mean that the decision can be overturned, substituted, or referred back for further 
juridical consideration. The Committee stresses that this clause should not be interpreted as 
‘permitting the use of procedural legislation which restricts or prevents enjoyment of this 
fundamental right.’53 
3.2 The relationship with right to be heard and other provisions of the CRC 
3.2.1 Article 12 and Article 5: Evolving capacity of the child
54
 
Article 12 walks the line between the child’s dependency on the family and liberty of 
expression. While a child falls within the scope of application of the CRC, he or she is 
considered to be dependent on the protection and benefits of adults; however, the child is also 
provided a right of participation. It has been argued that Article 12 should be read in the light 
of Article 5, which refers to the child’s evolving capacity to exercise his or her rights.55 Both 
Article 5 and Article 12 have been identified as linked to the development of the person of 
                                                            
51 The representative can be the parent(s), a lawyer, or another person (inter alia, a social worker). 
52 General Comment No.12 (2009) 12. 
53 General Comment No.12 (2009) 12.  
54 Article 5: 
States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where applicable, the 
members of the extended family or community as provided for by local custom, legal guardians or 
other persons legally responsible for the child, to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving 
capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights 
recognized in the present Convention. 
55 Lűcker-Babel (1995) 394. 
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the child and both articles have a fluid nature in accordance with the stages of development of 
the child.
 56
    
The CRC protects ‘the responsibilities, rights and duties, of parents to guide and 
educate their children themselves.’57 Article 5, however, makes it clear that this guidance 
must be in a ‘manner consistent with the evolving capacity of the child’.58 The role that 
parents play in their child’s development must therefore progressively develop with the 
child’s growth.59 
3.2.2 Article 12 and Article 3: Best Interest of the Child
60
 
To establish what is in the best interest of the child, the views of the child is of crucial 
importance. The relationship between Article 3 and Article 12 is complementary. The two 
general principles reinforce each other and neither can be correctly applied without the 
consideration of the other. The Committee emphasises the crucial relationship between these 
two provisions in its General Comment on the best interests of the child by stating;  
‘Article 12 of the Convention provides for the right of children to express their 
views in every decision that affects them. Any decision that does not take into account 
the child’s views or does not give their views due weight according to their age and 
                                                            
56 Lűcker-Babel (1995) 397. 
57 Lűcker-Babel (1995) 394. 
58 Lűcker-Babel (1995) 394. 
59 Lűcker-Babel (1995) 394. 
60 Article 3: 
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare 
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child 
shall be a primary consideration. 
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her 
well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other 
individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and 
administrative measures. 
3. States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities responsible for the care or 
protection of children shall conform with the standards established by competent authorities, 
particularly in the areas of safety, health, in the number and suitability of their staff, as well as 
competent supervision. 
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maturity, does not respect the possibility for the child or children to influence the 
determination of their best interests.’61 
  Article 3 establishes the objective of achieving the best interests of the child and 
Article 12 provides the procedure for reaching the goal of hearing the child’s voice in matters 
affecting him or her. The voice of the child must therefore be respected in reaching any 
decision which purports to be in the best interest of that child. The Committee supports this 
view by stating that, ‘article 3 reinforces the functionality of article 12, facilitating the 
essential role of children in all decisions affecting their lives.’62 
The best interests of the child can be classified as a procedural right as it is the 
standard that has to be met by any decision-maker in any matter affecting the child and the 
best interest of the child has to be taken into consideration in all their decisions. States Parties 
to the CRC are compelled to assure that decision-makers hear the child as stipulated in 
Article 12.
63
 
Although it recognised that the relation between these two provisions is of a 
complementary nature, it is doubtful that Article 12 can be fully implemented if it violates the 
provisions of Article 3.
64
 The Committee also recognises that there are potential negative 
consequences of an irresponsible implementation of the right to be heard. In particular the 
Committee refers to cases involving younger children and occasions where the child has been 
a victim of a criminal offence, sexual abuse, violence, or other forms of mistreatment. Those 
responsible must, therefore, ‘undertake all necessary measures to ensure that the right to be 
heard is exercised ensuring full protection of the child.’65 
                                                            
61 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 14 (2013) – The right of the child to have his or 
her best interests taken as a primary consideration (art. 3, para. 1) 13. 
62 General Comment No.12 (2009) 18. 
63 General Comment No. 12 (2009) 18. 
64 Lűcker-Babel (1995) 394. 
65 General Comment No. 12 (2009) 10. See also Lurie (2004) 8. 
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3.2.3  Article 12 and Article 13: Freedom of Expression  
Article 13 is similar to the provisions of other international instruments, namely 
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and Article 19 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). 
Although similar in ‘spirit’, Article 13 and Article 12 do differ with regard to the 
arena a child would exercise these rights. Article 13 empowers a child to participate in the 
social and political life by expressing his or her opinion and receiving and exchanging 
information and ideas.
66
 These two provisions are distinguishable as follows, on the one 
hand, Article 12 contains internal qualifications with regard to the person of the child. In 
terms of Article 12 the child must be capable of forming a view and weight attached to those 
views depends upon the age and maturity of the child. Article 13, on the other hand, contains 
no such limitations and is of general application.
67
  
Freedom of expression is only curbed by the restrictions enunciated in Article 13(2), 
which states, ‘[t]he exercise of this right may be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall 
only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or 
reputations of others; or (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre 
public), or of public health or morals.’ This restriction is framed in such a way that it is clear 
that it will only step into operation in very limited circumstances.  The drafters of the CRC 
must have intended that a child’s freedom of expression must not easily be restrained. 
3.2.4 Article 12 and Article 9: Separation of the child from the family 
In relation to the child’s right to be heard and the family, Article 9 specifically refers 
to situations where one of the parents is living separately and a decision must be made as to 
the child's place of residence. Any determination made must be in the best interest of the 
                                                            
66 Lűcker-Babel (1995) 394. 
67 Lűcker-Babel (1995) 394. 
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child. Article 9(2) goes further to illustrate the direct relationship these provisions have with 
each other by providing that in any proceeding where a determination such as above has to be 
made ‘all interested parties shall be given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings and 
make their views known.’68 The child may not be specifically mentioned in this provision but 
an inference can be safely drawn that a child will be an ‘interested party’ in the separation 
proceedings of his or her parents.
69
 Article 9(2) illustrates that the drafters of the CRC catered 
for the child’s view to be taken into account in family law matters that affect him or her. 
The CRC is most probably the single most important document relating to children’s 
rights. However, like all other United Nations human rights treaties, it has no direct method 
of enforcement and no sanctions for noncompliance with its provisions. State parties are 
presumed to have ratified the CRC in good faith and with the intention of implementing its 
standards. The only mechanism to monitor the implementation of the CRC by State parties 
are the periodic reports that State parties must submit to a eighteen member committee of 
experts showing what measures have been taken in their country to implement the CRC.
70
 
4. THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON THE RIGHTS AND WELFARE OF THE 
CHILD 
4.1 Background 
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (“the Charter”) was 
adopted in July 1990 by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU) and came into force on 29 November 1999. The African human 
rights system is the first regional system to adopt a treaty specifically dealing with children’s 
rights and provides for the promotion, protection and monitoring of the rights and welfare of 
                                                            
68 Article 9(2) of the CRC. 
69 Lűcker-Babel (1995) 394. 
70 See Article 44 of the CRC.  
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children. The African regional system has thought it necessary to take further steps to protect 
children’s rights at a ‘supra-national level’ and so providing a voice for Africa’s children.71  
It is argued that the Charter is a necessary instrument because it takes the virtues of 
African culture, heritage, historical background and the values of African civilisation into 
consideration. It is these elements of African life that inevitably influence the concept of the 
rights and welfare of the child. The unique socio-economic, cultural, traditional and 
developmental circumstances is a critical situation facing most African children and the 
Charter takes special note of these circumstances.
72
 Ehlers and Frank submit that the intention 
of the Charter is to afford African children additional protection in the light of their 
particularly vulnerable position.
73
  
Although the Charter recognises that the African child occupies a unique and 
privileged position in African society and that for full harmonious development of his/her 
personality, the child should grow up in a family environment in an atmosphere of happiness, 
love and understanding,
74
 participation by children on issues that affect them is often met 
with opposition from people who see it as undermining adult authority within the family. It is 
also argued that despite the fact that children participate considerably in the daily work of 
their communities and, like adults, they are seen as having a responsibility to contribute to the 
subsistence of their families, ‘children’s participation in matters affecting them has met with 
formidable opposition from adults in social and political structures.’75 
                                                            
71 Lloyd A (2002) ‘A theoretical analysis of the reality of children’s rights in Africa: An introduction to the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’, 2 African Human Rights Law Journal 13. 
  
72 Lloyd (2002) 180. 
73 Ehlers L and Frank C (2008) ‘Child Participation in Africa’ in Sloth-Nielsen J (ed) Children’s Rights in Africa – A 
Legal Perspective, Ashgate, Farnham, Surrey, England 113. 
74 Preamble of the Charter. 
75 Ehlers and Frank (2008) 124. 
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The key participation provisions in the Charter are article 4(2) and Article 7.
76
 Present 
discussion will, however, focus on the provisions of Article 4(2).   
Article 4(2) of the Charter provides that:  
‘In all judicial or administrative proceedings affecting a child who is capable of 
communicating his/her own views, an opportunity shall be provided for the views of 
the child to be heard either directly or through an impartial representative as a party 
to the proceedings, and those views shall be taken into consideration by the relevant 
authority in accordance with the provisions of appropriate law.’ 
The CRC and the Charters provisions should be seen as complementary and mutually 
reinforcing. Like the CRC, the Charter is based on four principles which aid the interpretation 
of the Charter as a whole. These principles are non-discrimination, best interest of the child, 
the right to life, survival and development and the views of the child. Similar to the CRC, the 
underlying idea of the participation principle is that children have the right to be heard and to 
have their views taken into account in any proceedings affecting them.
77
  
It is argued that the Charter confirms or strengthens the global standards contained in 
the CRC. Article 1(2) of the Charter and Article 41 of the CRC address the question on which 
level of protection a State should adhere to if that State has ratified both instruments. Both 
these provisions provide that their provisions do not affect ‘any provisions that are more 
conducive to the realisation’ of children’s rights. Accordingly, where the Charter contains 
                                                            
76 Article 7: Freedom of Expression - ‘Every child who is capable of communicating his or her own views shall 
be assured the right to express his opinion freely in all matters and to disseminate his opinions subject to such 
restrictions as are prescribed by laws.’ 
77 Olowu D (2002) ‘Protecting children’s rights in Africa: A critique of the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child’,10 The International Journal of Children’s Rights 129. 
 
 
 
 
24 
stricter provisions, the stricter provisions prevail.
78
 Viljoen also submits that the guiding 
principle in resolving interpretative disputes between these two instruments should be that 
‘the best interest of the child shall be the primary consideration.’79 
4.2 Comparison between the Charter and the CRC 
It is notable that the Charter does not include a provision on respect for the views of 
the child in general, but entitles only the child to the right to be heard in judicial and 
administrative procedures. The Committee on the Rights of the Child has stressed that 
children’s right to express their views in all matters affecting them is a free standing right.80   
Du Toit correctly argues that a child’s right to participation in the Charter is both 
stronger and weaker than its equivalent in the CRC.
81
 The main difference between the 
provisions under discussion concerns the conception of the child’s ability to express an 
opinion. The CRC refers to a child who is ‘capable of forming…views’, while, the Charter 
refers to children ‘capable of communicating … views’. Participation is therefore only 
conditional on the child’s ability to communicate his or her views. The Charter is in this 
instance phrased in a more restrictive way than the CRC because a child may not be able to 
verbally communicate a view but could have formed a view. 
The Charter, conversely, does not contain the further limitations of child’s age, 
maturity and stage of development as determinative of the weight that should be attached to 
the child’s views. It could be argued that this limitation can be read into the words ‘capable of 
                                                            
78 Lloyd (2002) 22. It is recognized that the Charter contains stricter provisions with regard to the recruitment of 
child soldiers (article 22), child betrothal (article 21(2)), other harmful and cultural practices (article 21(1)) and 
child refugees (article 23 provides that internally displaced children receive the same protection as refugees). 
79 Article 4(1) of the Charter. Viljoen F (2009) ‘The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ in 
Boezaart T (ed) Child Law in South Africa 338. 
80 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, 43rd Session , “Speak, Participate and Decide – The 
Child’s Right to be Heard” , Day of General Discussion, 15 September 2006 – Introduction 1 Submissions 
available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/discussion.htm  (last accessed 6 January 2013). 
81 Du Toit C (2009) ‘Legal Representation of Children’ at 95 in Boezaart T (ed) Child Law in South Africa Juta 
& Co, Ltd: Cape Town. 98. 
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communicating his or her views’.82 Viljoen submits that this limitation may not only pertain 
to the child’s age but also to the level of education and articulateness of the child.83 
With regard to how the child’s views are to be weighed, the fact that the CRC 
provides that ‘due weight’ must be given to the child’s views ensures that the views must be 
made known to the decision-maker. The Charter provides that the child’s views must be 
taken into consideration. It is submitted that if the decision-maker is obliged to give due 
weight to the child’s views, a decision cannot be made freely as the decision-maker must be 
able to show how the child’s views effected his decision.84 
The African Charter goes a step further than the CRC by providing in Article 4(2) that 
the child may participate through an ’impartial representative as a party to the proceedings’ 
which would place the child’s representative on even footing with the other parties. The 
Charter therefore specifically provides for a procedure through which the child may place his 
or her views before the court.
 85
 
The CRC and the Charter both allow the child to participate, directly or indirectly, 
through the appointment of a legal representative.  Appointing separate legal representation 
for a child is a form of participation and will not be necessary in every matter concerning the 
child.
86
 Ideally the child will have the opportunity to choose from various participation 
methods, how he or she would like to share his or her views.  
                                                            
82 Gose M (2002) The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child Community Law Centre, 
University of the Western Cape 127. 
83 Viljoen F (2009) 338. 
84 See Gose (2002) 126 where he argues along these lines.   
85 Brossy v Brossy (602/11) [2012] ZASCA 151 (28 September 2012) – Submissions by the Amicus Curiae para 
23. 
86 Du Toit (2009) 98. 
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The limitation clause of the Charter further states that the child’s views shall be taken 
into consideration ‘in accordance with the provisions of appropriate law’. This phrase in the 
Charter gives wide discretion to State parties and limits the right conferred on the child. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The CRC and the Charter both have stronger and weaker aspects. The CRC apply to 
children who are able to form a view and the Charter apply to children who are able to 
communicate their views.  
The chapter establishes that Article 12(2) relates specifically to the to the right of the 
individual child to participate in judicial and administrative proceedings such as divorces. 
Article 12(1) refers to the right of the child to express his or her views freely in all matters 
affecting him or her and creates a general right of participation. It is concluded that the 
Charter encompasses a comprehensive set of children’s rights and confirms or strengthens the 
global standards contained in the CRC. 
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CHAPTER 3  :  THE EVOLUTION OF LEGISLATION WHICH PROVIDE FOR 
 CHILD PARTICIPATION IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In order to fulfil its international obligations, South Africa must implement the rights 
contained in international legal instruments in its domestic legislation. The Committee on the 
Rights of the Child specifically recognises the obligation to implement the right of 
participation in the context of divorce proceedings specifically and General Comment No. 12 
provides that’…all legislation on separation and divorce has to include the right of the child 
to be heard by decision makers and in mediation processes’.87 This chapter will therefore deal 
with the domestication of child’s right to be heard in family law matters which affect them. 
The main focus of the chapter will be one aspect of this right, which is the right to legal 
representation for children in such matters.  
The appointment of legal representation for children as a method of participation has 
seen much development in legislation. The right to legal representation is but subsection 
within the broader right to be heard. Legal representation is therefore a method to realise the 
child’s right to be heard. Carnelley observes that ‘[c]hildren have the right to be heard and 
have their expressed views considered if they are of a suitable age, maturity and stage of 
development, it is submitted that not all children (even those of a suitable age, maturity and 
stage of development) would require, desire or be entitled to separate legal representation at 
state expense.’88 
                                                            
87 General Comment No.12 (2005) 15. 
88 Carnelley M (2010) ‘The Right to Legal Representation at State Expense for Children in Care and Contact 
Disputes – A Discussion of the South African Legal Position with Lessons from Australia’ 31:3 Obiter 644. 
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The question to be addressed in this chapter is whether current legislation is sufficient 
to guarantee that children’s voices will be heard in matters that affect them, whether this be 
done through a legal representative or otherwise. 
  The chapter will look at different legislative provisions and draw from the criticism 
and praise it received to conclude whether provisions in the current Children’s Act are 
sufficient to ensure that children’s voices are heard in judicial proceedings. The chapter will 
also look at the different forums in which children may need to be legally represented and 
what provisions are in place to ensure that a child that should be legally represented is indeed 
so represented. The chapter will also look at certain mechanisms that the legislature has 
provided to ensure that a child’s right to access to courts is realised.  
In South Africa legal representation for children is mostly seen in three main types of 
proceedings, namely children’s court enquiries, civil proceedings where a curator ad litem is 
appointed and family law matters.
89
 Family law matters involving children are usually 
matters related to divorce proceedings or post-divorce disputes regarding maintenance for the 
children or care and contact of the children.
90
 Children’s court proceedings usually include 
adoption matters, foster care or child-removal cases.
91
 Civil proceedings can entail an array 
of matters from alienation of a child’s property to personal injury claims to enforcement of 
constitutional rights.   
2. LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN AND THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1996. 
                                                            
89 Sloth-Nielsen J (2008) ‘Realising Children’s Rights to Legal Representation and to be Heard in Judicial 
Proceedings: An Update’ 24 South African Journal on Human Rights 498. 
90 Sloth-Nielsen (2008) SAJHR 502.  
91 See Section 45 of the Children’s Act on matters the Children’s Court may adjudicate. 
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2.1 Section 28 of the Constitution 
South Africa ratified the CRC on 16 June 1995
92
 and thereby agreed to ‘respect and 
ensure’ the rights of children as set forth in this international instrument.93  South African 
courts are required to have regard to the international and regional instruments when 
interpreting any legislation relating to children.
94
  
Section 28 of the 1996 Constitution grants specifically defined rights to children in 
addition to those rights given to all citizens.
95
 Section 28 has been described as ‘a mini-
charter of rights created for children only.’96 Section 28 provides a further layer of protection 
by specifying that a child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter 
concerning the child.
97
  South Africa’s Constitution has been hailed internationally as a prime 
example of a constitution which protects and advances children’s rights.98  
Children’s interests are best protected when they are treated as independent legal subjects 
rather than objects of adult concern. It has been observed that the inclusion of children’s 
rights in the Constitution ensures that children have the grounds and institutional means to 
influence the decisions affecting their own lives. Section 28, therefore, seeks to achieve the 
                                                            
92See Olivier M (2000) ‘The Status of International Children’s Rights Instruments in South Africa’ at 197 in CJ 
Davel (ed) Introduction to Child Law in South Africa Juta & Co, Ltd: Cape Town 
93 Article 2 of CRC.  
94 Section 39 of the Constitution obliges courts to consider international l.a.w. when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights. 
95 Section 28(1) clearly states ‘every child’ has the rights listed in the section. The South African Constitution 
confirms this by stating in section 7(1) that the Bill of Rights ‘…enshrines the rights of all the people in our 
country…’ and most of the rights in the Bill of Rights are afforded to ‘everyone’. Section 28(3) determines that 
children, for the purposes of section 28, are persons under the age of eighteen years. There are certain rights that 
are not afforded to children, such as the right to vote. 
96 Bekink B & Brand D (2000) ‘Constitutional Protection of Children’ at 173 in Davel CJ (ed) Introduction to 
Child Law in South Africa Juta & Co, Ltd: Cape Town. 
97 Section 28(2). 
98 Skelton A (2009) ‘Constitutional Protection of Children’s Rights’ at 265 in Boezaart T (ed) Child Law in 
South Africa, Juta & Co, Ltd: Cape Town. 
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mandate of Article 12 of the CRC, providing that ‘in all matters affecting the child, the views 
of the child [will be] given due weight. 
99
 
2.2 Section 28(1)(h) of the Constitution 
2.2.1 Interpreting Section 28(1)(h) 
Section 28(1)(h) allows for the legal representation for children and reads as follows: 
‘(1)  Every child has the right -   
h. to have a legal practitioner assigned to the child by the state, and at state expense, 
in civil proceedings affecting the child, if substantial injustice would otherwise 
result;’   
Section 28(1)(h) reflects the rights contained in Article 12(2) of the CRC.
100
  In terms 
of this provision, child participation will therefore have to be accomplished by (legal) 
representation.
101
   
In comparison with article 12 of the CRC, section 28(1)(h) has been found to provide 
a more secure right to legal representation. A weakness of article 12 that has been identified 
is that it allows for alternatives to legal representation.
102
 Section 28(1)(h) only provides for 
only  ‘legal practitioners’ to represent a child in court, while article 12(2) of the CRC refers to 
a ‘representative’ and the African Charter provides for an ‘impartial representative’.  Du Toit 
                                                            
99 Spitz (2005) 878. 
100 Tobin  has identified South Africa as one of twenty countries that have constitutional provisions dedicated to 
children’s  rights. Tobin also observes that there is a growing trend to include provisions that guarantee 
participatory rights of children, freedom of expression and respect for their opinions and thoughts in accordance 
with their age and level of maturity. See Tobin J (2005) ‘Increasingly Seen and Heard: The Constitutional 
Recognition of Children’s Rights’ 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 110 and 116.  
101 2-20 Commentary on the Children’s Act. The inclusion of the right to legal representation in civil 
proceedings was met with some reservation, especially from the Government officials, as it would have a severe 
cost implication for the legal aid system. Kassan (2004) 36.  
102 Zaal N & Skelton A (1998) ‘Providing Effective Representation for Children in a new Constitutional Era: 
Lawyers in the Criminal and Children’s Courts’ 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 541. 
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points out that section 28(1)(h) only mentions the appointment of a legal practitioner for a 
child and does not refer to any broader right of participation attaching to children.
103
 
Section 28(1)(h) entitles every child to legal representation at state expense in civil 
proceedings, if substantial injustice would result if the child were unrepresented.
104
 This 
provision is not limited by the capability of the child to form and express his or her view as 
provided for in the CRC , but applies to ‘every child’. It is also is not limited to the extent that 
it only applies to a child who is capable of communicating his or her own views, as provided 
for in the African Charter. 
105
 
It is has been correctly argued that the constitutional right is awarded irrespective of 
whether the child is a party to proceedings, otherwise directly involved or affected by the 
judicial proceedings where they are not directly before court. For example in the divorce 
proceedings of their parents or contact and care disputes in respect of a child, the child will 
not be directly before court but such proceedings will inevitably affect the child’s life. The 
enforcement of this constitutional right has, however, posed some problems, especially 
regarding the interpretation of the phrase “substantial injustice”.106 
2.2.2  The “substantial injustice” test  
The application of section 28(1)(h) raises the question whether the inclusion of the 
phrase “substantial injustice” indicates that children do not have an automatic right to legal 
representation in civil proceedings or whether the right to legal representation in civil matters 
only arises if substantial injustice would otherwise result. 
It has been pointed out that the “substantial injustice” test narrows the scope of the 
right especially in comparison with its international and regional counterpart in article 12(2) 
                                                            
103 Du Toit C (2009) 96. 
104 3C38 Bill of Rights Compendium, Butterworths Durban: 1996  
105 Kassan (2004) 37.  
106 Kassan (2004) 37. 
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in the CRC and article 4(2) of the African Charter.
107
 Du Toit draws a comparison between 
section 28(1)(h) and section 35(3)(g) in terms of which legal representation has to be 
assigned to an unrepresented criminally accused person at state expense.
108
 In terms of 
section 35(3)(g) the right to legal representation arises once an accused person is 
unrepresented and requests legal representation.
109
 Du Toit concludes that the ‘assignment’ of 
a legal practitioner in section 28(1)(h) and the ‘assignment’ of a legal practitioner in section 
35(3)(g) must be based on the same principle.
110
 
Zaal and Skelton also make the comparison between section 28(1)(h) and section 
35(3)(g). They point out that the right to legal representation created by the Final Constitution 
is limited in scope and dependent on a ‘vague, predictive ground – the “substantial injustice” 
test – which may prove somewhat difficult to delineate in practice.’111 Skelton also points out 
that, ‘the difficulty with the wording of section 28(1)(h) is that it fails to de-link the right 
children to have separate legal representation in civil matters from the assignment of the right 
by the state and at state expense. In this regard, it differs from the right to legal representation 
in criminal matters provided for in section 35 of the Constitution, which establishes firstly, 
the right to have legal representation, and secondly, to have a legal representative assigned by 
the state at state expense.’112  
                                                            
107 Sloth-Nielsen (2008) SAJHR 503.  
108 Section 35(3)(g) of the Constitution reads as follows: “Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which 
includes the right… (g) to have a legal practitioner assigned to the accused person by the state and at state 
expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed of this right promptly;”. 
109 The Child Justice Act 75 of 2008, which came into force on 1 April 2010, extensively addresses the legal 
representation of children in criminal proceedings in the newly formed Child Justice Courts in Chapter 11. 
Section 82(1) specifically provides “[w]here a child appears before a child justice court in terms of Chapter 9 
and is not represented by a legal representative of his or her own choice, at his or her own expense the presiding 
officer must refer the child to the Legal Aid Board for the matter to be evaluated by the Board as provided for in 
Section 3B(1)(b) of the Legal Aid Act , 1969.” (my emphasis) Section 83(1) further provides that no child 
appearing before a child justice court may waive his or her right to legal representation.   
110 Du Toit (2009) 104. 
111 Zaal & Skelton (1998) 541. 
112 Skelton A (2008) ‘Special Assignment: Interpreting the Right to Legal Representation in terms of Section 
28(1)(h) of the Constitution of South Africa’ in in Sloth-Nielsen J & Du Toit Z (eds) Trials & Tribulations, 
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Case law has dealt with the interpretation of ‘substantial injustice’ extensively and 
courts have endeavoured to spell out factors that should be taken into account in concluding 
whether the non-appointment of a legal representative will result in substantial injustice. The 
“substantial injustice” test, therefore, invites courts to consider each case on its own facts. 
In Centre for Child Law and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others
113
 the 
court considered when legal representation for children is appropriate and necessary. This 
case dealt with the detention of a number of foreign unaccompanied children at a repatriation 
camp and who were facing imminent and unlawful deportation. The court observed that the 
inaccessibility of legal representation in the adjudication process had further exacerbated the 
crisis now existing in the treatment of unaccompanied foreign children. The court recognised 
that these children are particularly vulnerable and there was a risk that these children’s rights 
would be violated if they were not legally represented.  
Section 28(1)(h) has been interpreted in conjunction with the international law by the 
Constitutional Court to give effect to children’s right to participation. The Constitutional 
Court has used section 28(1)(h) to appoint a curator ad litem to protect the interests of very 
young children despite the fact that it was open to them to do so in terms of the common law. 
In Du Toit and Another v Minister of Welfare  and Population Development and Others (Gay 
and Lesbian Equality Project as Amicus Curiae)
114
 the court stated that where there is a risk 
of substantial injustice the court is obliged to appoint a curator ad litem for the child and that 
obligation flows from section 28(1)(h) of the Constitution. The court  emphasised that in 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Trends & Triumphs: Developments in International, African and South African Child and Family Law, Juta & 
Co, Ltd: Cape Town 225. 
113 2005 (6) SA 50 (TPD) par 581-590C. 
114 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) par 3. 
 
 
 
 
34 
matters where children’s interests are at stake those interests must be ‘fully aired’ before the 
court so as to avoid substantial injustice to those children ‘and possibly others.’115 
Legal Aid South Africa has also attempted to determine what the content of 
“substantial injustice” is in its 2012 Guide. In terms of the 2012 Guide, the following factors 
must be considered before a child may receive legal representation in a civil case at state 
expense:
116
 
 ‘The seriousness of the issue for the child, for example, if the child’s 
constitutional rights or personal rights are at risk. 
 
 The complexity of the relevant law and procedure. 
 
 The ability of the child to represent himself or herself effectively 
without a lawyer. 
 
 The financial situation of the child or the child’s parents or 
guardians. 
 
 The child’s chances of success in the case. 
 
 Whether the child has a substantial disadvantage compared with 
the other party in the case.’ 
 
The Legal Aid Guide 2012 continues that: ‘[i]f a child is assisted by his/her parents or 
guardians, who exceed the means test  and can afford to provide legal representation for the 
child, yet fail, refuse or neglect to do this, then legal aid will be provided to the child if 
substantial injustice would otherwise result. If this happens, Legal Aid SA may institute 
proceedings against the parents or guardians to recover these costs if: 
                                                            
115 Par 3. 
116 Par 4.18.1 of the Legal Aid Guide 2012, 12th Edition, available from www.legal-aid.co.za last accessed 30 
July 2013. 
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-the parents or guardians could afford to provide legal representation for the child as part of 
their duty of support, and 
-they neglect, failed or refused to provide legal representation for the child.’117 
 It is has been correctly argued that the proper interpretation of section 28(1)(h) is to 
recognise a child’s right to legal representation as a separate right. The requirement that 
‘substantial injustice would otherwise result’ applies only if legal representation for the child 
is to be provided at state expense.
118
 
2.2.3 Implementation of the right to separate legal representation  
A issue that must be considered is the court’s role in ensuring the implementation of 
this right. All relevant factors and circumstances will have to be evaluated. It has been argued 
that the court should at least ensure that a child in legal proceedings whether criminal or civil, 
must have been informed of his or her right to legal representation.
119
 This is essential 
especially where the child is directly involved in the proceedings.  
In in R v H and Another
120
 the court went further than just informing the children of 
their right to representation and  the child’s right to separate legal representation was raised 
mero motu by the court.
121
 Judge Moosa appointed a legal representative for the child in 
terms of section 28(1)(h), after consultation with the parties, the Family Advocate and the 
Legal Aid Board. The court also relied on the provisions of article 12 of the CRC in 
considering the appointment of a legal representative. The judge considered the following 
factors in deciding that it was appropriate to assign a legal representative for the child: the 
drastic nature of the relief sought by the mother which would sever all contact between the 
                                                            
117 Par 4.18.3 of the Legal Aid Guide 2012. 
118 Brossy v Brossy (602/11) [2012] ZASCA 151 (28 September 2012) – Submissions by the Amicus Curiae par 
74-76. 
119 Bekink & Brand (2000) 193. 
120 [2006] 4 All SA 199 (C) 
121 Par 6. 
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child and his father; the possibility that the best interests of the child may not be compatible 
with the interests of the custodian parent; the interests of justice required that the child’s 
views be articulated; and the appointment of a separate legal representative may be in the best 
interests of the child.
122
 Judge Moosa appointed a legal representative for the child to 
articulate the child’s views and represent his interests in the proceedings. The legal 
representative was also subsequently joined as second defendant to the proceedings. 
The court confirmed in the case of Legal Aid Board v R
123
 that a child may apply 
directly to the Legal Aid Board for a legal representative to be appointed in terms of section 
28(1)(h) of the Constitution. In casu a twelve-year-old girl approached Childline for 
assistance in the divorce matter of her parents where her custody was in dispute. The court 
observed that where the court is dealing with acrimonious litigation regarding the custody of 
a child, it was a necessary conclusion that substantial injustice to the child would result if the 
child were not afforded the assistance of a legal practitioner to make his or her voice heard.
124
 
Acting Judge Willis found that questions about where a child is to live and which parent will 
be making the most important decisions in the child’s life is of crucial importance to the 
child. The child will be subject to those decisions and must live with the consequences; it is 
therefore vitally important that her views are taken into consideration when making these 
decisions. 
The court held that the Legal Aid Board was entitled at the state’s expense to render 
assistance to a minor in the discharge of the State’s obligation in terms of section 28(1)(h) of 
the Constitution if the failure to do so would otherwise result in substantial injustice.
125
 The 
                                                            
122 Par 6. 
123 2009 (2) SA 262 (D). 
124 Par 20. 
125 Par 3. In R v M (Unreported) Case number: 5493/02, Durban High Court, which preceded Legal Aid Board v 
R Govindsamy AJ explores the Legal Aid Act 22 of 1969 and the Legal Aid 2002 and comes to the conclusion 
that the Act does not specifically empower the Legal Aid Board to provide legal assistance in terms of section 
28(1)(h).  Govindsamy AJ then proceeded to order that the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
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court further held that the Legal Aid Board was not constrained by a need to obtain either the 
consent of the child’s guardian or that of any person exercising parental responsibilities and 
rights in relation to the child, or an order of court.
126
 The case of Legal Aid Board confirms 
that a court order assigning legal representation is not necessary nor is it necessary for the 
court to decide whether legal representation of the child is necessary. Legal Aid South Africa 
may assign legal representation for children at their own discretion according to the Legal 
Aid South Africa Guidelines.
127
   
3. LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION OF CHILDREN IN 
FAMILY LAW MATTERS 
3.1 Legislative Framework Prior to the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 
There have been some efforts made to provide legislation to give effect to the right in 
section 28(1)(h). The first of the effort was the 1996 amendment to the Child Care 
Act,
128
with the inclusion of section 8A. However, this provision never became operative.
129
 
Section 10 of the Children’s Act is now meant fulfil this constitutional mandate.  
A piecemeal approach to child legislation with the several amendments to the Child 
Care Act proved unsatisfactory in the light of the constitutionalisation of the children’s rights 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
and not Legal Aid take the necessary steps to ensure that a legal practitioner is appointed for the child. See 
Skelton (2008) for further discussion on this judgment which Govindsamy AJ later set aside.  
126 Par 35. It is submitted that the Legal Aid Board could also have applied to the court for the appointment of a 
curator ad litem in terms of section 14 of the Children’s Act. 
127 Brossy v Brossy (602/11) [2012] ZASCA 151 (28 September 2012) – Submissions by the Amicus Curiae par 
74-76. 
128 See the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 and the Child Care Amendment Act 96 of 1996. 
129 For full discussion on Section 8A and its accompanying Regulation 4A see Sloth-Nielsen J & Van Heerden B 
(1997) ‘New Child Care and Protection Legislation for South Africa? Lessons from Africa’ Stellenbosch Law 
Review 262 and Sloth-Nielsen J & Van Heerden B (1996) ‘Proposed Amendments to the Child Care Act and 
Regulations in the Context of Constitutional and International Law developments in South Africa’ South African 
Journal on Human Rights 251; Zaal N (1997) ‘When should Children be Legally Represented in Care 
Proceedings?’ An Application of Section 28(1)(h) of the 1996 Constitution’ 114 South Africa Law Journal 336; 
Mosikatsana T (1997) ‘Children’s Rights and Family Autonomy in the South African Context: A Comment on 
Children’s Rights under the Final Constitution’ 3 Michigan Journal of Race and Law 365.   
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and the ratification of the CRC.
130
  Similarly, with the ratification of the African Charter on 7 
January 2000 it became clear that South Africa’s child care and protection legislation needed 
to be re-worked into a comprehensive piece of legislation that dealt with the rights contained 
in these instruments. It is the preceding occurrences that were the main driving force for the 
total overhaul of South Africa’s legislation on child care and protection.131  
3.1.1 Divorce Act 70 of 1979 
Section 6(4) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 permits a divorce court
132
 to appoint a 
legal practitioner to represent a child at the proceedings, and may order the parties or any one 
of them to pay the costs of the representation.  
  Section 6(1)(a) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 provides that a court shall only  grant  a 
decree of divorce if it is satisfied that the provisions made for the welfare of any minor or 
dependant child of the marriage are satisfactory or are the best that can be affected in the 
circumstances. Section 6(1)(b) further provides that if the Family Advocate has instituted an 
enquiry, the court must consider the Family Advocate’s report and recommendations before 
granting a decree of divorce. Courts often rely on the Family Advocate to ascertain the views 
of the children and to introduce those views in his or her report.  
The court must aim for the best possible, or at least near best possible outcome for the 
children involved. The outcome which is least disruptive to the children’s lives should be 
considered as the best possible outcome. The nature of divorce proceedings and the 
accompanying emotions may make this a difficult task for courts. However, section 6(4) in 
                                                            
130  Keightley also points out that the Constitution and the CRC worked in tandem to extend the influence of 
international norms over many areas of South African national law related to children. Keightley R (1996) 
‘Children and the Legal System: An Overview of Issues Raised by Contributors’ at 3 in Keightley R (ed) 
Children’s Rights Juta &Co, Ltd: Cape Town. 
131 Sloth-Nielsen J & Van Heerden B (1999) ‘The Political Economy of Child Reform: Pie in the Sky’ in Davel 
CJ (ed) Children’s Rights in a Transitional Society Protea Book House: Pretoria 108. 
132 Divorces previously fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court but the Jurisdiction of the 
Regional Courts Amendment Act 31 of 2008, which came into effect on 9 August 2010, has given Regional 
Court civil jurisdiction to deal with matters previously dealt with by High Courts only.  
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effect asks courts to look beyond the acrimony of the parties and aim for an outcome that will 
benefit the children. It is submitted that this outcome would be more likely if the children are 
given an opportunity to submit their views, if they wish to do so. Section 9 of the Children’s 
Act further supports this submission and provides that, ‘[i]n all matters concerning the care, 
protection and wellbeing of a child the standard that the child’s best interest is of paramount 
importance, must be applied.’  A court seized with a divorce matter must therefore appoint a 
legal representative for the child affected by such a matter, if it’s in the best interest of that 
child.  
In the past, however, courts have rarely employed this power to appoint legal 
representatives for children affected by their parent’s divorce or matters incidental thereto, 
for example variation of care and contact disputes, maintenance orders, and applications 
brought under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 
(which is now regulated by the Children’s Act).133    Section 6(4) of the Divorce Act was 
more often used to appoint a curator ad litem for children.
134
 
Section 6(4) has not been without criticism. Firstly, it has been pointed out that the 
Divorce Act provisions do not meet the constitutional requirement because it does not contain 
the ‘substantial injustice’ test as contained in section 28(1)(h).135 Second, the court could only 
employ this provision where the parties are wealthy because parties who are not well-off will 
rarely be able to afford the appointment of another attorney or advocate. Third, the provision 
does not provide the option of state-funded legal representation, even in instances where 
‘substantial injustice’ would otherwise result.136  
3.1.2 Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act 
                                                            
133 Sloth-Nielsen (2008) SAJHR 503.  
134 Du Toit C (2009) 104.  
135 Sloth-Nielsen (2008) SAJHR 503. 
136 Kassan (2004) 49. 
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Mediation in Certain Divorce Matter Act 24 of 1987 established the Office of the 
Family Advocate. The Office of the Family Advocate has a duty to protect the interests of 
children affected by divorce or in any dispute regarding the contact with and care of a child, 
such as an unmarried father’s request for contact with his child. Although the procedure that 
the Office of the Family Advocate employs will be discussed in detail the chapter to follow, it 
is apt at this stage to mention their core functions, which are:   
 Monitoring of pleadings and settlement agreements regarding the parental 
responsibilities and rights in respect of the children of divorcing parents. The 
Family Advocate must ascertain the parenting arrangements contained therein 
are prima facie in the best interest of the child.  
 Mediation of disputes regarding parental responsibilities and rights in order to 
find a workable solution for the parties and which is in the best interest of the 
child involved. The Family Advocate will assist the parties as an independent, 
neutral third party to arrive at a settlement regarding matters concerning the 
child.  
 Assessment of the parents and the children in order to make a meaningful 
recommendation to the court regarding the parental responsibilities and rights 
with respect to the children involved.
137
 
These functions are all derived from the central aim and purpose of the Office of the 
Family Advocate, which is to ensure that in all matters which may affect a child the best 
interest of the child is protected and are paramount.
138
  
                                                            
137 Kaganas F & Budlender C (1996) Family Advocate Law, Race and Gender Research Unit, University of 
Cape Town 4-6. 
138 For a further discussion of Section 28(1)(h) of the Constitution, section 6(4) of the Divorce Act and the 
duties and functions of the Family Advocate see Kassan D (2008) ‘Children’s Right to Legal Representation in 
Divorce Proceedings: Proposed Guidelines Concerning when a Section 28(1)(h) Legal Practitioner might be 
deemed be necessary or Appropriate’ in Sloth-Nielsen J & Du Toit Z (eds) Trials & Tribulations, Trends & 
Triumphs: Developments in International, African and South African Child and Family Law, Juta & Co, Ltd: 
Cape Town. 
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3.2 Legal Representation and Participation in the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 
The distinction between participation and representation is made at the outset of this 
Chapter. Legal representation realizes the child’s right to participate in judicial proceedings 
‘through a representative…, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national 
law.’139 
3.2.1. Child Participation - Section 10 
The participation principle is ever present in the Children’s Act and at the core of the 
participation in the Children’s Act is section 10.140 In terms of section 10 of the Children’s 
Act 38 of 2005, which came into effect on 1 July 2007,    
‘(e)very child that is of such an age, maturity and stage of development as to be able 
to participate in any matter concerning that child has the right to participate in an 
appropriate way and views expressed by the child must be given due consideration.’ 
Section 10 incorporates article 12(1) of the CRC into South African domestic law and 
many of the considerations which is applicable to article 12(1) would be equally applicable in 
considering section 10. Section 10 confirms the positive obligation on decision-makers to 
listen and take the views of children seriously both in terms of international law and domestic 
                                                            
139 Article 12(2) of the CRC.  
140 On review of the Child Care Act, the South African Law Commission recommended extensive provisions 
regarding legal representation for children in the new Children’s Act in order to give effect to section 28(1)(h) 
of the Constitution and the international law. The recommendation specifically listed the situations when legal 
representation should be appointed for the child. These included the following circumstances: if it was requested 
by the child; it is recommended by the social worker; it appears that a child was abused or deliberately 
neglected; if any recommendation in respect of placement of the child is contested by the child or the child’s 
parent or caregiver; if two or more adults are applying in separate applications for the placement of the child 
with them; if the court has terminated the legal representation of the child; or if substantial injustice would 
otherwise result. (See South African Law Commission Project 110 Review of Child Care Act Discussion Paper 
103 (December 2001) par 631 pp 98-100). 
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law. In deciding how much weight should be given to a child’s view in any particular matter, 
the ‘twin criteria’ of age and maturity must be considered.141   
Similar to article 12, so too section 10 has been identified as a general principle of the 
Children’s Act.142 The participation principle in section 10 must therefore be taken into 
consideration when interpreting the whole of the Act. This submission is supported by section 
6(2)(a) of the Act which states that ‘all proceedings, actions or decisions in a matter 
concerning a child must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the child’s rights set out in the 
Bill of Rights, the best interests of the child standard set out in section 7 and the rights and 
principles set out in this Act.’ 
Boezaart and De Bruin, correctly argue, the right to participation is a gateway to the 
right of the child to legal representation in civil matters as set out in section 28(1)(h) of the 
Constitution. However, the application of section 28(1)(h) is broader than section 10 as it 
applies to ‘every child’. Section 10 is limited to children who are of such age, maturity and 
stage of development as to be able to participate in an appropriate way.
143
  
The inclusion of a general right of participation for children was a significant step 
taken by the legislature. Fitschen v Fitschen
144
 illustrated that there was a definite gap in the 
legislation with the court holding that Article 12 of the CRC had not been incorporated into 
domestic law and, therefore, the appointment of a separate legal representative for the child 
was also not justified in the circumstances as the court was in possession of psychologist and 
Family Advocate reports. 
                                                            
141 Davel & Skelton (2007) 2-13. 
142 Barrie G (2013) ‘Giving due consideration to views expressed by the child in family law proceedings: The 
Australian experience and lessons for South Africa’ 1 Tydskrif vir die Suid Afrikaanse Reg 124. 
143 Boezaart T & de Bruin D (2011) ‘Section 14 of the children’s Act 38 of 2005 and the Child’s capacity to 
litigate’ 44(2) De Jure Fn 117.  
144 Unreported Case number 9564/95, Cape Provincial Division, 31 July 1997.  
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 It is submitted that such a shift does require a mind shift on the part of litigants, legal 
practitioners, the presiding officers and other professionals. In DG v DG,
145
 the court noted 
that the Children’s Act brought about a fundamental shift in the parent/child relationship 
which prevailed in the pre-constitutional era. The Court was enjoined by the Act to give due 
consideration to the views of the children, who were of an age and level of maturity to make 
an informed decision. The court noted that although sections 10 and 31 of the Act recognises 
a child’s right to be heard in any major decisions involving him or her, the applicant’s two 
experts advocated that the children’s voices not be heard in this case.  
Section 10 makes it clear from the outset of the Act that the opinion of the child is one 
aspect in the determination of the child’s best interests that can no longer be ignored. It is 
somewhat unfortunate that the views of the child were not expressly listed in section 7 of the 
Children’s Act as factors to be considered when determining the child’s best interests,146 
nevertheless, it is submitted that provision is a guiding principle to the application of the 
whole Act. 
3.2.2 Access to court - Section 14  
Section 14 provides that ‘every child has the right to bring, and to be assisted in 
bringing a matter to a court, provided that matter falls within the jurisdiction of the court.’ 
The section addresses the question whether it is possible for children to institute proceedings 
in a court.
147
  
3.2.2.1 The Common Law Position of the Child’s Capacity to Litigate  
The common law position regarding a child as a party to litigation has remained 
unchanged until parts of the Children’s Act come into force in 2007. When considering the 
                                                            
145 [2010] JOL 25706 (E). 
146 Carnelley (2010) 643. 
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child’s capacity to litigate, the common law distinguished between the child’s capacity as an 
infans and as a minor.
148
  In common law the infans was a child under the age of seven years 
old and had no capacity to litigate in his or her own name. The parent or guardian of the 
infans had to sue for or be sued on behalf of the infans. The infans was, however, the party to 
the lawsuit and not the parent or guardian. The parent or guardian had to represent the infans 
in court because the infans did not have independent standing in court.
149
  
The capacity of a minor to litigate in common law was limited and the general sense 
was that minors had no persona standi in iudicio. A minor could therefore not institute court 
proceedings or defend legal proceedings without the assistance of their parents or guardians.  
The natural guardian of a minor would need to assist such a minor when issuing summons 
and act in a representative capacity for such a minor when the minor was sued.
150
  
The question whether section 14 had removed the common law restriction was 
discussed but left undecided by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Legal Aid Board in re Four 
Children.
151
 Four children approached the Legal Aid Board for assistance in a relocation 
dispute between their divorced parents. The court observed that the immediate hurdle to be 
overcome was that a minor is not generally competent to engage in litigation without the 
assistance of his or her guardian. In this case their guardians were disqualified from doing so 
because they would have had a conflict of interest.
152
 All that was required to overcome this 
hurdle, the court stated, was for the children – or the Justice Centre153 on their behalf – to ask 
                                                            
148 Boezaart & De Bruin (2011) 417. 
149 Boezaart & De Bruin (2011) 418. 
150 Boezaart & De Bruin (2011) 418. 
151 Unreported Case number 512/10,Supreme Court of Appeal, 29 March 2011. This matter emanates from a 
High Court application the children instituted in their own name with the assistance of the Legal Aid Board for 
an order interdicting their mother from moving them to Pretoria. Schoeman J found that the children did not 
have legal capacity to litigate and a curator ad litem must be appointed before the children may institute 
proceedings without the assistance of a guardian. DG v DG [2010] JOL 250706 (E). 
152 Par 6. 
153 The Legal Aid Board performs its function through several Justice Centres which are spread throughout the 
country.  The Justice Centres employ attorneys and candidate attorneys to provide legal representation to the 
indigent.  
 
 
 
 
45 
the court to appoint a suitable employee of the Justice Centre as curator ad litem in the 
exercise of its ordinary discretion.
154
 
The Justice Centre did not follow the above route and the case was presented instead as 
an application for the appointment of a legal practitioner under section 28(1)(h) of the 
Constitution. The Justice Centre argued that it wished to assure the court that ‘we act in this 
application only to give the children the voice that they need to enforce their best interests’.155 
The order that was sought was declaratory relief to the effect that: 
 ‘That where Legal Aid South Africa assigns a legal representative to a child in terms of 
its Constitutional mandate to act in the best interest of that child, that the said child will have 
locust standi to litigate to protect a constitutional right without the consent of that child’s 
parent/s or without the consent of the Court.’156 
The Supreme Court of Appeal made no order as the case before it was not an appeal and 
the court has no original jurisdiction to consider an application for a declaratory order.
157
 It is 
correctly submitted by Boezaart and De Bruin that section 14 did not remove the common 
law restrictions on a child’s capacity to litigate.158 
3.2.2.2 Interpretation and Application of Section 14 
                                                            
154 Par 15. 
155 Par 17. 
156 Par 21. 
157 In this case neither the parents nor the children were before the Appeal Court. The Legal Aid Board stated 
that it brought the appeal to gain clarity on its position and in the public interest. It seems that the children did 
not authorize the proceedings and were not aware that the proceedings had been brought. The court observed 
that the children were distressed at the proceedings before the Appeal Court and felt that their privacy had been 
invaded. The proceedings also had no more direct effect on the children as because the family difficulties had 
been resolved and both parents once again lived in the same city and the harmonious arrangement that prevailed 
before had been restored. Par 3-7.    
158 Boezaart & De Bruin (2011) 418. 
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It has been argued that the child’s common law capacity to litigate has been extended 
by section 14 if one makes a literal interpretation of the words ‘every child’ in section 14.159 
Section 14 makes no distinction at all between children below the age of seven (an infans in 
common law) and children older than seven.  
Section 14 is of general application and is not limited to matters relating to the 
Children’s Act. The only requirement is that the court which is approached has jurisdiction to 
hear the matter.
160
 Section 14 is in line with section 34 of the Constitution which grants 
everyone the rights to access to courts. Section 14 provides the means by which a child is to 
have access to courts, i.e. by assistance from a guardian, parent or legal representative.
161
  
Section 14 also links up with section 28(1)(h)
162
 because the child may need the 
assistance of a legal representative to bring a matter to court. Section 28(1)(h) of the 
Constitution does not specifically mention the child’s right of participation but such a right 
can be implied in civil proceedings as section 28(1)(h) provides for a method of participation. 
In bringing a matter to court, a child will in all likelihood require the assistance of a legal 
representative and will need to obtain such representation before approaching a court.  It is 
submitted that section 14 relates to the institution of legal proceedings and its operation 
cannot be dependent on the assignment of a legal representative by a court first. 
Section 14 takes the issue one step further by creating an entitlement to such assistance 
in bringing a specific matter to court. The section 18(3)(b) places a corresponding obligation 
on parents and guardians to represent children and to assist them.
163
 Section 18(3)(b) of the 
                                                            
159 Heaton J (2008) Law of Persons 3 ed (2008) LexisNexis, Durban; 4 ed (2012) 92. 
160 Section 45 of the Children’s Act stipulates the matters that the Children’s Court may deal with.  
161 Heaton points out that section 14 confers the right on a child to have his or her limited capacity to litigate 
supplemented by assistance of a parent, guardian, curator ad litem, or the High Court as upper guardian of all 
children. Heaton (2008) 89. 
162  Davel & Skelton (2007) 2-19. 
163 Boezaart & De Bruin (2011) 419. 
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Act states that ‘…a parent or other person who acts as guardian of a child must - …(b) assist 
or represent the child in administrative, contractual and other legal matters;’164  
In the event that the child’s parents or guardians are unable or unwilling to assist the child 
in bringing a matter to court, it is submitted that such a child will be entitled apply directly to 
the Legal Aid Board for assistance, without the consent of his or her parent or guardian.
165
  
 Section 14 extends a child’s right to participate in terms of section 10 by securing the 
child’s right to access to courts and so to initiate civil proceedings.166 It is submitted that both 
sections 10 and 14 align with section 28(1)(h).
167
  However, Davel points out that section 14 
is not as limited as section 28(1)(h) because it does not include the “substantial injustice” test. 
Davel further indicates that the word ‘assisted’ in section 14 has a more extensive application 
than ‘representation’ as found in section 28(1)(h) of the Constitution. 168 Coupled with the 
guarantee of legal representation entrenched in section 28(1)(h) of the Constitution, children 
are assured that there is always assistance in the form of legal representation available.
169
 
When comparing section 14 with Article 12(2) of the CRC and Article 4(2) of the African 
Charter, the section should be interpreted extensively to allow the broadest possible platform 
for the voice and views of children to be heard and considered in court. Section 14 refers to 
“every child” and places no limitation on the right of access to court.170  
A case which considered the question of a child’s capacity to litigate was Ex Parte Van 
Niekerk: In re Van Niekerk v Van Niekerk.
171
  The children involved were two girls of age 
fourteen and twelve. The mother alleged that the children did not want to have contact with 
                                                            
164 My emphasis.  
165 Davel & Skelton (2007) 2-24. 
166 Boezaart & De Bruin (2011) 429 
167 Boezaart & De Bruin (2011) 429. 
168 Davel (2007) 2-23 
169 Boezaart & De Bruin (2011) 432.  
170 Boezaart & De Bruin (2011) 432.  
171 [2005] JOL 14218 (T). 
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their father due to his violent behaviour. The father alleged that the mother was unreasonable 
and actively alienating the children from him.  The court ordered that the parents and the 
children undergo therapy to attempt to normalise the family situation. The children, however, 
refused to submit to treatment.  
The court observed that while the parents were flinging allegations at each other for 
the cause of the children’s feelings, the children had not had an opportunity to state their 
views or to have their interests independently put before the court. In order for the court to 
have a balanced presentation of the situation, the children or someone on their behalf must 
put their case before court.  
The court considered whether the children should be joined as parties to the 
proceedings as they had a clear interest in the outcome of the proceedings. The court held that 
to give proper effect to section 28(1)(h) the court is entitled to join the children as parties to 
proceedings affecting their best interests. Further, the court held that unless the children were 
joined as parties, they would not be able to appeal against an adverse order. The court was in 
favour of appointing a legal representative in terms of section 28(1)(h) of the Constitution.
172
 
It is therefore submitted that section 14 would have given these children the opportunity to 
seek assistance from elsewhere, as their parents were unable to assist.  
3.2.3 Enforcement of Rights - Section 15 
Section 15 states that ‘anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a 
competent court, alleging that any rights in the Bill of Rights or this Act has been infringed or 
threatened, and the court may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights.’  
                                                            
172 The court, however, was of the view that the State Attorney should appoint a legal representative in terms of 
section 28(1)(h).  Par 5.  
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This provision gives the child who is affected by or involved in the matter the right to 
approach the court for appropriate relief, specifically if a right in the Bill of Rights
173
 or in the 
Act has been infringed or threatened. Section 14 gives the child the right to be assisted in 
bringing such a matter to court for appropriate relief and, thus, provides the procedure on 
how the child who is affected by or involved in a matter is to approach the court for 
appropriate relief. Section 14 and section 15 work in tandem to secure the child’s right to 
access to courts to obtain appropriate relief. Section 14 guarantees the child the right to 
demand assistance either from a parent or guardian and if they are unable or unwilling, to 
demand the assistance of legal representative in terms of section 28(1)(h) of the Constitution. 
The child’s right of access to courts can thus also be implied from section 28(1)(h).174  
Section 15 extends the participatory right in section 10 by securing the child’s right to 
access to a competent court where there has been infringement of a right in the Bill of Rights 
or a right as provided for in the Children’s Act. With all these provisions working in tandem, 
there can be no doubt that the child has the opportunity and the right, to approach the court 
and demand assistance to do so. 
3.2.4 Parental Responsibilities and Rights  
The Children’s Act does not include a specific section providing for separate legal 
representation for the child in all matters as a general principle, but provides for legal 
representation for the child in different chapters of the Children’s Act.   
                                                            
173 With regard to infringement of rights in the Bill of Rights see Minister of Education v Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 
(CC) where Chief Justice Langa observed that ‘It is always desirable, and may sometimes be vital, to hear from 
the person whose religion or culture is at issue. That is often no less true when the belief in question is that of a 
child.  Legal matters involving children often exclude the children and the matter is left to adults to argue and 
decide on their behalf.’ See also Antonie v Governing Body, Settlers High School and Others 2002 (4) SA 738 
(C), a 15 year-old Rastafarian girl successfully brought an application in her own name to challenge the school 
governing body’s decision to find her guilty of serious misconduct for wearing her hair in dreadlocks. 
174 Boezaart & De Bruin (2011) 429. 
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Section 29, in Chapter 3 of the Act which deals with parental responsibilities and rights, 
does, however, assist in providing for legal representation for the child in certain 
circumstances. Section 29(6) states that the court may appoint a legal representative for the 
child and may order that the parties to the matter or any one of them be held responsible for 
payment of the legal costs.
175
 Echoing section 28(1)(h) of the Constitution, the section also 
makes provision for the court to order that the State be responsible to pay the cost of such 
representation, if substantial injustice would otherwise result. Section 29(6) is, however, not 
of general application and Section 29(1) limits the application of section 29(6) to applications 
brought in terms of certain sections.
176
  
The Children’s Act provides several more mechanisms to ensure that children’s 
voices are heard in parental responsibilities and rights matters.
177
 For instance, the 
implication of the child’s right to participation is that due consideration must be given to the 
views and wishes of the child in the development of any parental responsibilities and rights 
agreement in terms of section 22, bearing in mind the child’s or children’s age, maturity and 
stage of development.’ A person who has parental responsibilities and rights in respect of a 
child may confer specific parental responsibilities and rights on a person who did not have 
any parental responsibilities and rights prior to the agreement.  
                                                            
175 Section 29 specifically states that it is subject to section 55 of the Act. Section 55 is included in Chapter 4, 
which regulates all the aspects of the Children’s Court. Section 55 will be discussed below, under the heading of 
Children’s Court Proceedings. It has also been identified that section 29 is comparable to section 6(4) of the 
Divorce Act 70 of 1979. This section was not commonly employed by courts to appoint legal representation for 
children. Section 6(4) was discussed above under the heading, Divorce Act 70 of 1979.  
176 Section 29(6) applies only to applications brought in terms of: section 22(4)(b) – parental responsibilities and 
rights agreements must be made an order of court; section 23 – assignment of contact and care to interested 
person by order of court; section 24 – assignment of guardianship by order of court; section 26(1)(b) – person 
claiming paternity may apply to court for an order confirming paternity and; section 28 – termination, extention, 
suspension or restriction of parental responsibilities and rights.  
177 Section 31(1)(a) also provides that ‘before a person holding parental responsibilities and rights in respect of a 
child takes any decision…involving the child, that person must give due consideration to any views and wishes 
expressed by the child, bearing in mind the child’s age, maturity and stage of development.’ See DG v DG in 
this regard.  
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In implementing section 22, the legislature has ensured that general participation 
principle in terms of section 10 is complied with throughout the process. The first mechanism 
that ensures that the child’s voice is heard is contained in section 22(5), which provides that 
before registering a PRR Agreement or before making it an order of court, the Family 
Advocate or the court must be satisfied that PRR agreement is in the best interest of the child. 
The Family Advocate must confirm that; (1) information about the content of the PRR 
Agreement has been furnished to the child/children, bearing in mind the child/children’s age, 
maturity and stage of development and; (2) the child/children have been given an opportunity 
to express their views and that these views have been given due consideration.
178
    
The second mechanism is contained in section 22(6)
179
 which states, that a child, with 
leave of the court, may bring an application to amend or terminate a parental responsibilities 
and rights agreement. Granting the child the opportunity to bring an application, with leave of 
the court, is present throughout Chapter 3 of the Children’s Act and similar provisions can 
found in Section 34(5)(b) and 28 (3)(c).
180
  
 It is evident that where a is child granted the right to approach a court, such a child will 
need legal assistance to approach a court to obtain permission to bring the application. The 
Children’s Act therefore indicates that children will be able to obtain legal representation 
independent of the court, i.e the legal representative does not have to be assigned by the 
                                                            
178 General Regulations Relating to Children 2010, Form 5 to the Regulations.  
179 Section 22 read with Regulation 7 (General requirements pertaining to Parental Responsibilities and Rights 
Agreements) and Regulation 8 (Mediation and participation of the child concerning Parental Responsibilities 
and Rights) of General Regulations Regarding Children, 2010.  
180  See Bekink M (2012) ‘“Child Divorce”: A Breaking from Parental Responsibilities and Rights due to the 
Traditional Socio-Cultural Practices and Beliefs of the Parents’ Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 15(1) 
195 for a full discussion on the suspension or termination of parental responsibilities and rights.  
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court.
181
 The relation between section 14 and section 28(1)(h) of the Constitution becomes 
apparent
182
 once again.     
The Children’s Act provides children with access to the courts in several of its 
provisions and the participation principle is present throughout the Act. A further example of 
such participation is section 33 read with regulation 10 and 11, which makes provision for the 
participation of the child in the preparation of a parenting plan. Regulation 11 makes it clear 
that a child must be consulted during the development of the parenting plan, and granted an 
opportunity to express his or her views, which must be accorded due consideration, bearing in 
mind the child’s age, maturity and stage of development. Regulation 11 goes further and 
requires that the content of the parenting plan must be shared with the child. 
 The question that arises is whether the provisions provide enough specificity about 
how these rights and opportunities are to be utilised by children. Procedural aspects regarding 
the implementation of these substantive rights and remedies may be somewhat lacking from 
the Children’s Act but it is submitted any omissions can be easily addressed with further 
regulations to the Act and also looking at the existing rules of the relevant court. It is 
therefore submitted that current legislation is sufficient to provide children with an 
opportunity to voice their views. The Children’s Act does employ many mechanisms to 
ensure that children are not excluded from the decision-making process in matters that affect 
them. What is needed is major efforts in information sharing and education to make 
individuals, potential litigants and children aware of these rights and opportunities.  
4. LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION OF CHILDREN IN 
CHILDREN’S COURT PROCEEDINGS 
 
                                                            
181 Du Toit (2009) 106. 
182 Boezaart & De Bruin (2011) 421. 
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The Children’s Act prescribes that all processes followed in the court ‘must be 
designed to avoid adversarial procedures’.183 Section 60(3) goes further and requires that 
proceedings in these courts ‘must be conducted in an informal manner and, as far as possible, 
in a relaxed and non-adversarial atmosphere which is conducive to attaining the co-operation 
of everyone involved…’. The investigatory and co-operative approach of the Children’s 
Court is conducive to ensuring the best interest is established and familial relations are 
preserved. It is observed that the adversarial approach followed in ordinary civil matters 
would be counter-productive in a court that mostly deals with children’s residential 
placements, parental rights and responsibility disputes and family services.
184
 Care and 
protection proceedings in the Children’s Court are informal and inquisitorial, while divorce 
and care and contact proceedings are by their nature much more adversarial nature.
185
  It is 
also submitted that the family law system would do good to expand this approach to all other 
forums dealing with family law matters. This submission is supported by the general 
principle in the Children’s Act that, ’[i]n any matter concerning a child an approach which is 
conducive to conciliation and problem-solving should be followed and a confrontational 
approach should be avoided.’186 
The Children’s Act extends the jurisdiction of matters in which a Children’s Court may 
adjudicate.
187
 It is observed that by allowing the Children’s Court to hear parental 
responsibilities and rights disputes, more children will have the opportunity to have their 
voices heard because the Children’s Court is more accessible to the public.   This section will 
therefore focus predominantly on how children are heard in parental responsibilities and 
rights disputes heard by the Children’s Court.  
                                                            
183 Section 52(2). 
184 Pillay & Zaal (2011) ‘Protecting Parties from Ambush: Some Recommendations on Discovery in Children’s 
Court Litigation’ 128(4) South African Law Journal 635. 
185 Du Toit (2009) 101. 
186 Section 6(4) of the Children’s Act.  
187 Section 45(1) of the Children’s Act sets out which matters the children’s court may adjudicate. 
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4.1 Legal Representation of Children – section 55   
Children’s Act provides in section 55 that where a child involved in a matter before 
the children’s court is not represented, and the court is of the opinion that it would be in the 
best interest of the child to have legal representation, the court must refer the matter to the 
Legal Aid Board.
188
 This is a welcome provision in the Children’s Act as children in the 
children’s court especially require representation. This court has the power to move children 
into institutions or places of safety for long periods, which is a drastic change of 
circumstances and which can be traumatic for the child. Even more so when the child does 
not receive the opportunity to have his or her view put before the court.
189
 
Section 55 leaves the decision to appoint a legal representative for the child in the 
discretion of the Presiding Officer. The Presiding Officer must decide whether it will be in 
the best interest of the child to have legal representation. Boezaart and De Bruin observe that 
‘the deprivation of the child’s liberty in a children’s court matter is no less traumatic than the 
deprivation of the child’s liberty in a criminal matter.’190 For instance, where the child is 
removed and placed in temporary safe care without a court order in terms of section 152. 
Although the removal must be reviewed as soon as possible, there is no automatic right to 
legal representation for the child. Section 55 requires that the Presiding Officer must first 
consider whether legal assistance would be in the best interests of the child. Only once this 
determination is made is the matter then referred to the Legal Aid Board, who in turn applies 
                                                            
188 The Legal Aid Board referred to in section 2 of the Legal Aid Act 22 of 1969. The Legal Aid Board has for 
the past few years been operating under the name of ‘Legal Aid South Africa’. For the purposes of clarity, I will 
refer to the organization as the ‘Legal Aid Board’. 
189 Zaal & Skelton (1998) 542. 
190 Boezaart & De Bruin (2011) Fn 93. 
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the “substantial injustice” test before appointing a legal representative for the child at state 
expense.
191
  
Presiding officers have no guidelines or regulations on which to rely when exercising 
this discretion. It is submitted that the lack of guidelines will lead to the application of the 
section being inconsistent. Some presiding officers will frequently appoint a legal 
representative for the child, whilst, others will refrain from doing so due to the uncertainty of 
how and when the section should be applied.
192
 The number of conflicting orders and reasons 
stemming from the Children’s Court was apparent in the case of NM v Presiding Officer of 
the Children’s Court, District of Krugersdorp and Others.193 While the case dealt with the 
confusion by the Children’s Court in the interpretation of section 150(1)(a) of the Children’s 
Act, which deals with the applications for foster care and foster care grants, the court raised 
the preliminary issue of legal representation on behalf of the children.  
The appeal court identified the question which needed to be addressed as whether or 
not there is a duty upon the Presiding Officer to instruct legal representation for the children 
or to inform the appellant that she may approach the Legal Aid Board for legal representation 
for the children.
194
 The court confirmed that the Presiding Officer has a duty to at very least 
inform the appellant (maternal grandmother of the children) that she could approach the 
Legal Aid Board for assistance for the children.
195
 The court emphasised that the children’s 
rights must be jealously guarded particularly in matters which may adversely affect them.  
Section 55 makes it clear that Legal Aid must assist the child if the court so orders 
and provide a legal representative ‘where a child…is not represented’. Legal Aid has an 
inescapable duty to a child who is not represented already.  
                                                            
191 Boezaart & De Bruin (2011) Fn 93. 
192 Du Toit (2009) 107. 
193 2013 (4) SA 379 (GSJ); [2013] 3 All SA 471 (GSJ) (12 April 2013). 
194 Par 5. 
195 Par 7. 
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4.2 Participation of Children – Section 61 
Section 61 of the Act applies to proceedings in the Children’s Court which include 
both care and protection hearings and care and contact applications.
196
 Section 61 places a 
clear obligation on a Presiding Officer to allow the child to express his or her views and 
preferences if the court finds that the child is of an age, maturity and stage of development to 
participate in the proceedings.
197
  Although the obligation lies with the Presiding Officer to 
provide the child with the opportunity to express his or her views, the choice remains with the 
child whether to participate or not.
198
 The decision of whether the child has the capacity to 
participate is left to the Presiding Officer to determine. Section 61(1)(b) requires the 
Presiding Officer to record the reasons if a finding is made that the child cannot participate. 
This indicates that the Presiding Officer must consider the child’s capacity to participate.199  
The most significant feature of section 61 is the express provision that the child has a 
right to choose to participate. The expression of choice is significant because it unfortunately 
does not appear in any of the other participatory provisions of the Children’s Act. A child that 
has chosen to participate need not participate in every matter during court proceedings. There 
is the possibility that  child may be placed in an impossible situation should the child be 
forced to testify on statements made by the child to social workers or psychologists. It is thus 
submitted that the child must have a choice of how he or she wants to participate and the 
                                                            
196 Section 150(1) of the Act includes a list of circumstances under which a child can be considered to be in need 
of care and protection. 
197 Section 61(1) states, ‘The Presiding Officer in a matter before a Children’s Court must – (a) allow a child 
involved in the matter to express a view and preference in the matter if the court finds that the child, given the 
child’s age, maturity and stage of development and any special needs that the child may have, is able to 
participate in the proceedings and the child chooses to do so; 
198 The child’s opportunity to be heard in removal matters came before the Constitutional Court in C v 
Department of Health and Social Development, Gauteng 2012 (2) SA 208 (CC).  The court held that the 
representations by the child would allow the court to determine whether the removal was in the best interest of 
the child and without an opportunity for the child to be heard, the provisions sanctioning removal could not 
survive constitutional scrutiny.   
199 Gallinetti J (2007) ‘The Children’s Court’ in Davel & Skelton (eds) Commentary on the Children’s Act 4-1. 
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available options must be put to the child at the outset. A child may choose not to participate 
directly or at all.
200
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Section 28(1)(h) guided the way for legislature to draft enabling legislation which 
indeed brings international standards into domestic legislation. Further practical or procedural 
provisions may also be useful to ensure that children and all other parties know how to realise 
the rights given by legislation. Detail regarding how the available legislative remedies should 
be accessed is essential.  
An important omission is the child’s views in section 7 as one of the factors  that must 
be considered in determining what is in the best interests of the child. Such an inclusion 
would have undoubtedly strengthened the position of the participation principle in the 
Children’s Act.  
As put by Taylor et al
201, ‘…despite the political and legislative recognition of 
children’s participation rights internationally, this is just the first step towards embedding 
authentic, meaningful and well evaluated participatory processes to help ensure children, and 
what they say, are respected in family law settings.’  
 
 
  
                                                            
200 Du Toit (2009) 99. 
201 Taylor N, Fitzgerald R, Morag T, Bajpai A and Graham A (2012) ‘International Models of Child 
Participation in Family Law Proceedings following Parental Separation / Divorce’ 20 International Journal of 
Children’s Rights 671. 
 
 
 
 
58 
CHAPTER 4 :  DEVELOPMENTS IN CASE LAW AND COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION 
PROCEDURES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The question to be addressed in this chapter is whether current procedures are 
sufficient to guarantee that children’s voices will be heard in matters that affect them. This 
chapter will discuss the development of case law with regard to the court taking the child’s 
views into consideration. Case law will be analysed with specific reference to the method 
used to bring the child’s view before the court, be it by appointing a separate legal 
representative for the child, a curator ad litem, relying on family advocate reports and 
recommendations, expert evidence and reports or judicial interviews.  The procedures 
available in South Africa will be compared to those available in Australia to determine 
whether there are any lessons that South Africa can learn from that jurisdiction.  
While there might be a theoretical right to be heard, this is not always realised in 
practice.
202
 ‘A crucial aspect of implementation is domestication of the rights in national 
legislation and judicial precedent, followed by implementation in practice.’203 Before the 
adoption of sections 10 of the Children’s Act and section 28(1)(h) of the Constitution, the 
courts were inconsistent about hearing the voice of the child. The attitude of the courts ranged 
from express consideration of the child’s views,204 to instances where the views of the child 
                                                            
202 Carnelley (2010) 641. Pillay and Zaal, available empirical research findings indicate that there is frequently a 
discrepancy between what ought to happen and what actually happens in regard to hearing the views of children. 
Pillay R and Zaal N (2005) ‘Child-interactive video recordings: A Proposal for Hearing the Voices of Children 
in Divorce Matters’ 122 South African Law Journal 685. 
203 Sloth-Nielsen (2008) SAJHR 495. 
204 French v French 1971 (4) SA 298 (W) the court held that ‘the wishes of the child will be taken into account’, 
in the case of ‘more mature children’ through consideration of their’ well-informed judgment, albeit a very 
subjective judgment.’ (299H) ; Manning v Manning 1975 (4) SA 659 (T) 661G-H; Mathews v Mathews 1983 (4) 
SA 136 (SE) 141B; Märtens v Märtens 1991 (4) SA 287 (T) 294C-D; McCall v McCall 1994 (3) SA 201 (C) 
The Court in McCall v McCall observed that in the decisions of Manning v Manning  and Märtens v Märtens   
where it was made clear that ‘if the Court is satisfied that the child has the necessary intellectual and emotional 
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were deliberately not considered and the courts failed to mention the children’s wishes.205 
Children’s wishes were ignored or not considered for various reasons, including where the 
evidence in this regard was insufficient or contradictory or the children’s preferences could 
carry no weight because the children concerned were too young or immature or had been 
influenced by a parent.
206
  
In most decisions where the child’s views come up for consideration the courts tend to 
focus on the question of whether or not the child should be regarded as competent to make a 
choice. The court generally determines the child’s competency with the help of the resources 
at its disposal, whether that be expert reports, the legal representative of the child, a report by 
a curator ad litem etc. The reported cases seldom discuss the reasoning behind the chosen 
method of presenting the child’s views to the court or the efficacy of the chosen method .  
In matters dealing with where children will live, who they will have contact with, 
where they will go to school and what extra-curricular activities they may participate,  the 
child’s views are crucial as it is the child who will ultimately be subject to the decision of the 
court.  In order to determine the child’s bests interests, the court must have sufficient 
information, including the child’s views and wishes on the possible outcomes of legal 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
maturity to give in his expression of a preference a genuine and accurate reflection of his feelings towards and 
relationship with each parent of his parents, in other words to make an informed judgment, weight should be 
given to his expressed preference.’(207H-J); Meyer v Gerber 1999 (3) SA 650 (O) the Court followed a 
different approach, by taking into consideration the child’s maturity rather than the child’s age. (656); I v S 2000 
(2) SA 993 (C) 997D-E; Lubbe v Du Plessis 2001 (4) SA 57 (C) 73E-I; Prins v Claasen [2008] JOL 21693 (SE) 
6; Potgieter v Potgieter (Unreported) Case number: 215/2006, SCA, 30 March 2007, par 20; Blumenow v 
Blumenow (2008) JOL 21382 (W) par 28.   
205 Greenshields v Wylie 1989 (4) SA 898 (W) 899G-H; Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W); Van 
Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1999 (4) SA 435 (C )court dismissed the children’s feelings out of hand, holding that 
their reasons for not wanting to leave their home were ‘so childishly immature that I am satisfied that it would 
be unwise and indeed irresponsible to have any regard to such preferences as are supposed to have been 
expressed.’ 439J. The mother of the children in this case was in a lesbian relationship. This case has been 
rejected in our law because of the blatantly discriminatory conclusion the court came to. 
206 Stock v Stock 1981 (3) SA 1280; Van der Linde v Van der Linde 1996 (3) SA 509 (O) 513H-I; In B v P 1991 
(4) SA 113 (T) 119C-D. 
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proceedings.
207
 This chapter will focus on the methods of placing children’s views before the 
court regarding these issues.  
2. REPRESENTATION PROCEDURES AVAILABLE TO CHILDREN 
INVOLVED IN OR AFFECTED BY FAMILY LAW MATTERS  
 
2.1 Separate Legal Representative in terms of section 28(1)(h) of the Constitution 
  In recent years there has been a shift in the South African courts’ attitude towards the 
appointment of legal representatives for children.
208
 It was previously accepted that the views 
of the child were sufficiently canvassed by psychological or social work experts involved in 
the case, or by the Office of the Family Advocate, but the increased use of separate legal 
representatives indicates that in some instances this method of participation may be the most 
appropriate. The voice of the child, as represented by a separate legal representative, can play 
an important role in assisting the court in determining what would be in the best interests of 
the child.
 209
 The child’s legal representative is on even footing with the other parties and the 
child is assured that his or her wishes will be placed at the forefront of the court proceedings. 
It should be emphasised that this does not mean that the child’s wishes will be decisive.  
The matter of Soller NO v G and Another
210
 is the first reported case that deals fully 
with the interpretation of section 28(1)(h). The court expressed that ‘[t]he significance of 
section 28(1)(h) lies in the recognition, also found in the CRC, that the child’s interests and 
                                                            
207 Brossy v Brossy (602/11) [2012] ZASCA 151 (28 September 2012) – Submissions by the Amicus Curiae par 
30-31. 
208 Du Toit (2009) 100-101. 
209 Carnelley (2010) 641. 
210 2003 (5) SA 430 (W). 
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the adults’ interests may not always intersect and that a need exists for separate legal 
representation of the child’s views.’211  
2.1.1 Appointment of a Separate Legal Representative 
An initial question which comes up for consideration is who may appoint the separate 
legal representative (SLR) for the child. It is has been established that a child may approach 
the Legal Aid Board directly and a parent or guardian’s consent is not required for the 
appointment of a legal representative from the Legal Aid Board.
212
 Carnelley refers to the 
persons listed in section 38 of the Constitution
213
 and also identifies the parent-litigant, a 
curator ad litem, the family advocate, or the court as possible persons or entities which may 
appoint a SLR for a child.
214
 
A definitive list of circumstances where a SLR should be appointed is not advisable 
and it is submitted that each case has to be evaluated on its merits to determine whether a 
SLR for the child is required.  A child does not need separate legal representation in every 
family law matter affecting the child. The child’s views can adequately be put before the 
court and his or her right to participate fulfilled through other agencies such as the Family 
Advocate.
215
 The Draft Guidelines for Legal Representatives of Children in Civil Matters 
(2010)
216
 states that ‘legal representation of a child is a form of participation where the 
normal avenues of participation are not available or sufficient for whatever reason.’ Kassan 
also cautions against unnecessarily involving children in conflictual matters.
217
 It is 
                                                            
211 Soller NO v G and Another 434-435 paras 7-8. 
212 See Legal Aid Board v R. 
213 ‘anyone acting in their own interests; anyone acting on behalf of a child who cannot act in its own name; 
anyone acting as a member of, or in the interests of, a group or class of persons, anyone acting in the public 
interest; or an association acting in the interest of its members.’ 
214 Carnelley (2010) 646. 
215 Brossy v Brossy – Submissions by the Amicus Curiae para 31. 
216 Draft Guidelines for Legal Representatives of Children in Civil Matters (2010) 7 (copy on file with author). 
These draft guidelines were prepared by the Centre for Child Law, in consultation with Legal Aid South Africa. 
The Guidelines were submitted to Legal Aid South Africa in 2011 but does not have any ‘status’ yet.   
217 Kassan (2008) 228. 
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emphasised that sharing his or her views remains the choice of the child and further the 
choice of participation method is also that of child.   
Case law and several authors have considered the factors that may indicate the need to 
appoint a SLR for a child. There seems to be some consensus on the following factors:  
 The age, maturity and ability of the child to express his or her own views; 
 The length and acrimony involved in the litigation regarding parental rights and 
responsibilities in respect of the child;
218
 
 The complexity of the matter; 
 Where there are conflicting expert reports; 
  The likely impact the final decision will have on existing care and contact 
arrangements and the child’s daily life;  
 Where there is reason to believe that  a party to proceedings or a witness intends 
to give false evidence or is withholding information from the court; 
 Where there is a contradiction between the recommendations of the Family 
Advocate and the child’s expressed views; 
 Where there have been allegations of sexual, emotional or physical abuse of the 
child.
219
 
The Draft Guidelines identify these additional situations in which separate legal 
representation of a child may be required.  The Draft Guidelines aims to identify the kind of 
situation where it is advisable for the child to be legally represented.
220
 
                                                            
218 In Ex Parte van Niekerk and Another: In re Van Niekerk v Van Niekerk 2005 JOL 14218 (T). , Judge 
Hartzenberg held that: ‘The father wants the court to find that the mother is unreasonable and influencing the 
children against him, whereas the mother wants the court to find the father is a violent and mentally sick person. 
Both parents may be wrong. Only if the children or somebody on their behalf puts their case… will a court have 
a balanced presentation of the situation.’ (par 7) 
219 Sloth-Nielsen J(2002) ‘Children’ in Cheadle, Davis & Haysom (eds) South African Constitutional Law: The 
Bill of Rights 526 – 537; Carnelley (2010) 649; Kassan (2008) 236-238; Brossy v Brossy – Submissions by the 
Amicus Curiae para 37, Family Advocate v R, R v H 2005 (6) SA 535 (C) 539.  
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 ‘Where a child of sufficient age and maturity is strongly expressing a view and a 
desire to participate and their views are based on realistic expectation, i.e. the child 
cannot instruct that his parents must not get divorced; 
 Where there are real issues that relate to cultural or religious differences that are 
affecting the child; 
 If there are issues relating to the sexual orientation  of either or both parents (or other 
person having significant contact with the child) that are likely to steepen the conflict; 
 Where there are issues of significant physical or mental health problems in relation to 
either party or a child or other person having significant contact with the children; 
 When a child of mature years is expressing strong views, and giving effect to those 
views would mean changing a long standing care arrangement or denying one parent 
access completely; 
 Where one of the parties proposes removing the child permanently from the court’s 
jurisdiction; 
 In an adoption where a parent or third person is opposing the adoption;  
 Where it is proposed that siblings be separated; 
 In any matter in respect of Chapter 17 of the Children’s Act.’221 
 
2.1.2 The Role of the Separate Legal Representative 
The role of the SLR will depend, inter alia, on the nature of the proceedings, the age, 
maturity and stage of development of the child and the extent to which the child wishes to 
participate.
222
 Older children may require the assistance of a SLR who will act on their 
instructions and follow their instructions during litigation. This is referred to as client-
                                                                                                                                                                                         
220 Draft Guidelines (2010) 7.  
221 Draft Guidelines for Legal Representatives of Children in Civil Matters (2010) 8. 
222 Du Toit (2009) 109. Also Brossy v Brossy – Submissions by the Amicus Curiae par 46-47. 
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directed representation. If a child does not have the capacity to give instructions then the legal 
representative acts as a best-interests representative advocating for the objective best interests 
of the child. The role that the SLR will play is dependent on which of the models of 
representation is applicable to the situation. The determining factor in the choice of model is 
the capacity of the child and not the nature of the case.
223
 However, it is submitted that the 
nature of proceedings and the court in which the matter is heard (e.g. Children’s Court, 
Maintenance Court or High Court) does have some impact on the model of representation 
which would be appropriate.
224
 The SLR, however, must be clear about his role from the 
outset.
225
 The Draft Guidelines make it clear that it is not for the legal representative to assess 
the capacity of the child.
226
 The models of legal representation will now be discussed in more 
detail. 
2.1.2.1 Models of legal representation 
2.1.2.1.1 Client-directed legal representative 
In the Soller case, Satchwell J describes the role of the legal representative as follows: 
‘The legal practitioner stands squarely in the corner of the child and has the task of presenting 
and arguing the wishes and desires of that child. This task is not without certain inbuilt 
limitation. The practitioner does not only represent the perspective of the child concerned. 
                                                            
223 Carnelley (2010) 649-650. Carnelley  also observes that ‘the child can never totally direct the litigation as the 
client remains a child. Carnelley also submits that the distinction between the models of representation is 
fallacious as the constitutional best-interest principle would be applicable to, and the paramount consideration 
in, all matters relating to the child. Carnelley submits that there is only one model for legal representation of 
children and that is the best-interest legal representation.’ It is respectfully submitted that the models of 
representation are necessary to ensure that children’s interests are protected in all instances, whether the child is 
able to provide instructions or not. 
224 Brossy v Brossy – Submissions by the Amicus Curiae par 46-47. 
225 Carnelley (2010) 649-650. 
226The matter of BS and Another v AVR and Other (Unreported) case no 7180/2008 (South Gauteng High 
Court), 26 June 2008 dealt with the capacity of the children to give instructions and to understand the litigation 
process. There was a further risk that they may be called to give oral testimony and that they would be cross-
examined on their affidavits. The court required that a report be filed by an expert to indicate whether the 
children did have the capacity to understand the litigation and the meaning of the oath. It is submitted that this 
may not be necessary in every matter where the child is assigned a legal representative but where the children 
are young and there is some doubt as to the their capacity, it might be advisable to get an expert report from the 
outset. The legal representative’s role will then also be clear from the outset.  
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The legal practitioner should also provide adult insight into those wishes and desires which 
have been confided and entrusted to him or her as well as apply legal knowledge and 
expertise to the child’s perspective. The legal practitioner may provide the child with a voice 
but is not merely a mouthpiece.’227   
The court in Soller confirms the following attributes of the legal representative for a child: 
‘an individual with knowledge of and experience of the law but also the ability to ascertain 
the views of a client, present them with logical eloquence and argue from the standpoint of 
the client in the face of doubt or opposition from an opposing party or a court…’228  
If the SLR is appointed to act as a client-directed representative a standard attorney-
client relationship is created and the attorney or advocate will fulfil the same duties as he or 
she would in representing an adult. This form of representation is only possible where the 
child is of sufficient age and maturity and has the capacity to give instructions.
229
 It needs to 
be pointed out that the child’s capacity need not be akin to that of an adult and does not refer 
to the technical legal meaning of legal capacity.
230
 
 The client-directed legal representative’s general obligations are to advocate the 
child’s position and advise the child.231 Judge Satchwell confirms this role by stating that 
‘neutrality is not the virtue desired but rather the ability to take the side of the child and act as 
his or her agent or ambassador.’232  
 The Draft Guidelines also raises the issue that the representative should consider 
bringing an application on behalf of the child to join as an intervening party.  The 
circumstances will dictate whether the child should be joined as a party to proceedings. 
                                                            
227 440E-F. 
228 437F-H 
229 Draft Guidelines for Legal Representatives of Children in Civil Matters (2010) 4-5. 
230 Du Toit (2009) 109. 
231 Draft Guidelines for Legal Representatives of Children in Civil Matters (2010) 4-5. 
232 440C. 
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Factors such as the child’s age and maturity and the child’s views and wishes should guide 
the SLR’s decision. It has been pointed out that it might be advisable to join the legal 
representative nomine officio rather than the child, where the child is very young.
233
 
  If the child is joined the child’s representative will have all the entitlements other 
legal representatives have, i.e. calling and cross-examining witnesses, service of all court 
documents, submitting oral or written argument and the right to appeal. The Draft Guidelines 
submit that the best interest legal representative would also benefit from these opportunities if 
he or she applied for the joinder of the child.
234
 
2.1.2.1.2  Best interest legal representative 
This form of representation requires that the representative ensures that the best 
interests of the child are protected and that the views and wishes of the child are conveyed to 
the court. The role of a best interest legal representative has been described as similar to that 
of a curator ad litem in the High Court.
235
. In B and Others v G the court approved the notion 
that ‘in cases where very young children are involved, the role of the legal representative 
would be more akin to that of a curator ad litem, while with older children, the legal 
representative would take instructions from the child, act in accordance with those 
instructions and represent the child. ‘236  
                                                            
233 Brossy v Brossy – Submissions by the Amicus Curiae par 48-52. 
234 Draft Guidelines for Legal Representatives of Children in Civil Matters (2010) 15. 
235 Brossy v Brossy – Submissions by the Amicus Curiae para 46. 
236 2012 (2) SA 329 para 12, the court referring to Davel & Skelton Commentary on the Children’s Act (17-21). 
Also in Family Advocate v R, Adv Dyer which was appointed as the child’s legal representative in accordance 
with section 279 of the Children’s Act described his role as more of curator ad litem.  From an objective stance 
he could inform the court of the child’s wishes and views, from his personal interviews with the child and in the 
context of the psychologist reports that he could access.  In this case, Mr Dyer concluded from his interviews 
with J that although he could not give instructions because he could not foresee the consequences, J could 
express his opinion. His task was therefore to summarise evidence, represent the interests of the child and give 
an opinion to the court. For instance he had to consider whether there was influence on J by his mother or other 
family members. And if there was, whether this tainted the child’s views. These are not conclusions a legal 
representative can safely come to as it is the area of psychology. That is why Mr Dyer stressed that assistance 
expert opinion is crucial. Telephonic interview with Adv E Dyer on 10 April 2013. 
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This model is suitable for children who are either too young or immature to give 
instructions. Such children they may still be able to express views and wishes, which must be 
elicited and taken into account by the child legal representative. This model is also suitable 
for a child who is unable (due to an ongoing condition) or unwilling to participate.
 237
   
The best interest representative must at all times act in an unfettered and independent 
manner in the best interest of the child. He should come to an independent judgement of what 
would be in the best interest of the child.
238
  
The best interest representative must place the child’s views before the court, even if 
it conflicts with his own views. The views of the child however, must be placed within the 
context of the child’s age, maturity and background. The weight that should be attached to 
the child’s expressed views is for the court to decide and not the legal representative. 
Recommendations of the representative should be based on legal considerations and 
examination of factual and expert evidence.
239
 Carnelley observes that the legal 
representative must be appropriately protective of the child’s views240and do all possible to 
minimize the trauma to the child associated with the proceedings. 
2.2 Curator ad litem 
2.2.1 Appointment of a Curator ad litem 
A key method in the common law to bring children’s interests before the court in civil 
proceedings is through the appointment of a curator ad litem. A curator ad litem is appointed 
                                                            
237 Draft Guidelines for Legal Representatives of Children in Civil Matters (2010) 4-5. 
238 Draft Guidelines for Legal Representatives of Children in Civil Matters (2010) 4-5. 
239 Draft Guidelines for Legal Representatives of Children in Civil Matters (2010) 5.  
240 Carnelley (2010) 650-651. 
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by the court to conduct proceedings on behalf of another person who lacks the capacity to 
litigate.
241
  
In South African law there are four recognized grounds for the appointment of a 
curator ad litem for a child, namely where: (i) The minor is without parents or guardian; (ii) 
A parent or guardian cannot be found or is not available (for example, due to an accident); 
(iii) The interests of the minor are in conflict with those of the parent or guardian, or there is a 
possibility of such a conflict,
242
 or;  (iv) The parent or guardian unreasonably refuses to assist 
the minor.
243
 
The court has a wide discretion to appoint a person to substitute the guardian.  The 
court’s discretion also includes supplementing or altering the ordinary authority of a curator 
insofar as the matter requires and if it is necessary. The court’s discretion is only guided by 
the best interest of the child.
244
 
As Sloth-Nielsen importantly points out that a curator is usually appointed by the court to 
represent the interests of a child (in contrast to views) where these may be affected.
245
  
Reported judgment to date confirm that a curator ad litem to assist a child in matters that may 
possibly affect the interests of that child. Sloth-Nielsen points out ‘that presumably children’s 
views would be considered by the curator in establishing ‘best interests’’.246 
2.2.2 The Role of the Curator ad litem 
                                                            
241 Previously, only the High Court could appoint a curator ad litem. However, section 33 of the Magistrates 
Court Act makes it possible for the Magistrates’ Court to appoint a curator ad litem in any case where such a 
curator is required or allowed by law for a party to any proceedings. 
242 In Legal Aid Board in re Four Children the court observed that where there is a conflict of interest where the 
guardians of the children cannot assist them in instituting litigation, the ‘ready and simple mechanism to 
overcome it’ is the appointment of a curator ad litem . See also Adams v Adams (unreported case number: 
A106/11) Cape Town High Court, 1 February 2012, where a curator ad litem was appointed on the suggestion 
of the court. Legal aid was approached to assist with the appointment of a curator ad litem as such an 
appointment was not within the parties means. 
243 Davel & Skelton (2007) 2-24. See also Skelton A (2008). 
244 Legal Aid Board in re Four Children Par 13. 
245 Sloth-Nielsen (2008) 500. 
246 Sloth-Nielsen (2008) 502.  
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A curator is appointed to examine the circumstances surrounding the child (or 
children) in a particular situation.  One of the further functions of the curator is also to 
determine whether it is necessary for a legal representative to be appointed for the child.
 247
 
The court will appoint a curator ad litem where there is a risk of injustice in general.
248
 In 
Centre for Child Law v Minister of Home Affairs, the court first appointed a curator ad litem 
to represent the interests of the unaccompanied foreign children. The powers and duties of the 
curator include investigating the circumstances and making recommendations to the court 
regarding the future treatment of the children. While reporting back to the court, the curator 
successfully applied for an order in terms of section 28(1)(h) whereby the commissioner of 
child welfare was instructed to appoint a legal practitioner for each of the children at the 
repatriation centre.
249
  The legal representative in terms of section 28(1)(h) would in turn 
‘present and argue the wishes and desires of the children’.  
The distinction of the role of a legal representative and a curator ad litem therefore 
becomes clear. It is submitted, however, that ‘legal practitioner’ as used in section 28(1)(h) 
should be interpreted broadly to include the appointment of a curator ad  litem as well. These 
are both forms of child participation and as illustrated above, both can be used depending on 
the circumstances of the case and the ability of the child to direct litigation.
250
 
It is submitted that the role of the curator ad litem can be beneficial in family law 
matters
251
 but that the real value of such appointments lies in cases which deal with public 
                                                            
247 Carnelley (2010) FN 52.  
248 Carnelley (2010) FN 52. See Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population Development (Lesbian and Gay 
Equality Project as amicus curia) 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) par 3; S v M (Centre for Child Law as amicus curiae) 
2007 (2) SACR 53 (CC); and AD v DW (Center for Child Law as amicus curiae) 2008 (3) SA 183 (CC).  
249 Par 13. The court appointed the curator ad litem as the children’s legal representative in terms of section 
28(1)(h), referring to Soller v G where the task of a legal practitioner in terms of section 28(1)(h) is set out, and 
added that all unaccompanied children that find themselves in South Africa illegally should have a legal 
representative appointed to them by the State. (Par 27) 
250 Du Toit (2009) 97. 
251  See specifically In AD v DW (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae; Department for Social Development 
as intervening Party) 2008 (3) SA 183 (CC).  where  an American couple for sole guardianship of Baby R, in 
order for them to remove her to the United States, with the view to adopting her there. The Constitutional Court 
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interest matters.  The crucial contribution which a curator ad litem can make was recognised 
by the Constitutional Court in Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education, 
which dealt with the abolishment of corporal punishment and religious rights, where the court 
stated the following: 
We have not had the assistance of a curator ad litem to represent the interests of the children. 
It was accepted in the High Court that it was not necessary to appoint such a curator because 
the State would represent the interests of the child. This was unfortunate. The children 
concerned were from a highly conscientised community and many would have been in their 
late teens and capable of articulate expression. Although both the State and the parents were 
in a position to speak on their behalf, neither was able to speak in their name. A curator could 
have made sensitive enquiries so as to enable their voice or voices to be heard. Their actual 
experiences and opinions would not necessarily have been decisive, but they would have 
enriched the dialogue, and the factual and experiential foundations for the balancing exercise 
in this difficult matter would have been more secure.252 
2.3 The Office of the Family Advocate 
Despite the theoretical availability of legal aid for at least some cases, the presence in 
court of a separate legal representative for a child in family law matters remains uncommon. 
Courts therefore tend to rely heavily on family advocates as a neutral source of information 
about children in divorce cases and care and contact disputes.
 253
 It is therefore imperative to 
determine how accurately the family advocates and family counsellors who assist them 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
appointed a curator ad litem and the court made an order by agreement between the parties incorporating a 
recommendation which the curatrix made in her report. The court noted with regard to the report of the curatrix: 
‘The report of the curatrix was particularly helpful in regard to establishing the ripeness of the matter for an 
expedited hearing.’ Para 61.It should be noted that the curatrix’s appointment was extended to enable her to act 
on behalf of Baby R in the adoption proceedings. 
252 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC) 787. See also Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population Development (Lesbian 
and Gay Equality project as Amicus Curiae) 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) the case dealt with the discrimination 
against a same-sex couple with regard to the joint-adoption of a child. The court had a thorough report filed by a 
curator ad litem appointed by a court a quo regarding the welfare of the couple’s teenage children and of 
children (born and unborn) in general, who may be affected by the court’s order.  
253 Pillay and Zaal (2005) 687.  
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reflect the views of the children and whether this system is sufficient to ensure the realisation 
of children’s participatory rights.  
2.3.1 The Involvement of the Family Advocate 
The functions of the Family Advocate were originally restricted to High Court 
matters
254
 but the legislative mandate of the Office increased significantly with the 
introduction of new legislation
255
, as well as mandatory mediation provisions in the 
Children’s Act256 and the extension of this work to all lower courts.257 
The Family Advocate will be assisted by suitably qualified family counsellor or 
experienced social workers
258
 in making an enquiry after the institution of a divorce or after 
an application has been lodged for the variation, rescission or suspension of an order with 
regard to custody or guardianship of, or access to a child.
259
 Upon conclusion of the enquiry, 
                                                            
254 Section 2(1) of Act 24 of 1987.  
255 Some of the functions which the Children’s Act has added to the Family Advocate’s Office are:  
The referral of a dispute between two unmarried parents of the child regarding paternity for mediation in terms 
of section 21(3) of the Children’s Act; The registration of a parental responsibilities and rights agreement; 
Providing input in terms of section 23(3)(a) of the Children’s Act in the application for an order granting care of 
and contact with the child; an application in terms of section 28(3)(e) of the Children’s Act for the termination, 
extension, suspension or restriction of parental responsibilities and rights; The preparation of a report and 
recommendations in terms of section 29(5)(a) of the Children’s Act as read with section 29(6) of the Children’s 
Act regarding the appointment of a legal practitioner; Involvement in major decisions involving the child in 
terms of section 31(1); Involvement in terms of section 33(5)(a) in the formulation of parenting plans; 
Involvement in the formalities of family plan in terms of section 34(3)(b)(ii)(aa). See Boezaart & De Bruin 
(2011) Fn 123 
256 In determining the best interest of the child, section 7 of the Children’s Act requires that a factor that must be 
taken into account is ‘which action or decision would avoid or minimize further legal or administrative 
proceedings in relation to the child.’ For further discussion of mediation in the children’s Act see Schneider C 
(2007) ‘Mediation in the Children’s Act 38 of 2005’ Miller Du Toit Conference – 26 January 2007 available at 
www.famac.co.za/mediation/in-the-childrens-act (accessed 26 September 2013). 
257 See the Jurisdiction of the Regional Courts Act 31 of 2008. See also Regulation 4A of the Regulations made 
under the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act 24 of 1987, which provides for the circumstances in which 
court may cause investigation to be carried out by the Family Advocate in maintenance inquiries and domestic 
violence proceedings.   
258 In Terblanche v Terblanche 1992 (1) SA 501 (WLD) the court discussed to some extent the function and 
duties of the Family Advocate. The court held that ‘[t]he Family Advocate is particularly well equipped to 
perform such functions and duties, having at his or her disposal a whole battery of auxiliary services from all 
walks of life, including family counselors appointed in terms of the Act and who are usually qualified social 
workers, clinical psychologists, psychiatrists, educational authorities, ministers of religion and any number of 
other persons who may be cognizant of the physical and spiritual needs or problems of children and their parents 
or guardians, and who may be able to render assistance to the Family Advocate in weighing up and evaluating 
all relevant facts and circumstances pertaining to the welfare and interests of the children concerned.’  
259 Act 24 of 1987 still refers to the pre-Children’s Act terminology of ‘custody’ and ‘access’. Section 1(2) of 
the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 provides that “in addition to the meaning assigned to the terms ‘custody’ and 
‘access’ in any law and common law, the terms must be construed to mean ‘care’ and ‘contact’ as defined in the 
Children’s Act.  
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the Family Advocate must furnish the court with a report and recommendations on any matter 
concerning the welfare of each minor or dependant child of the marriage or regarding such 
matter as is referred to him by the court.
260
 The Family Advocate may be requested to 
conduct such an enquiry either by any party to the proceedings or the court, or the Family 
Advocate may apply to court for authorization to institute an enquiry into a matter before the 
court, if it appears that an enquiry is needed.
261
 The Family Advocate may also, if he or she 
deems it in the interest of the child concerned and if so requested by the court, appear at a 
trial or hearing and adduce any relevant evidence. The Family Advocate may then also cross-
examine any witness giving evidence.
262
 
Where the parties are in agreement about the care and contact arrangements of the 
children, their decision will effectively be made an order of court, with Family Advocate 
merely endorsing their settlement agreement. It is possible for the Family Advocate to 
investigate the arrangement and make a recommendation to the contrary but this is seldom 
done, especially where the arrangement is prima facie satisfactory.
263
  
Van Vuuren v Van Vuuren
264
 contains guidelines on when a Family Advocate ought to 
investigate the arrangements regarding children. An order authorising an enquiry must be 
applied for if it is envisaged that: 
 Custody of a young child will not be awarded to the child’s mother; 
 Siblings will be separated; 
 Custody will be awarded to a person other than the child’s parent; 
                                                            
260 Section 4(1) of Act 24 of 1987. 
261 Section 4(1) and 4(2) of Act 24 of 1987.  
262 Section 4(3) of Act 24 of 1987. 
263 Carnelley(2010) 649. 
264 1993 SA 163 (T) 
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 An arrangement regarding custody or access will be made which is prima facie not 
in the child’s interests. 
2.3.2 The Role of the Family Advocate 
The Act does not set out the procedure that the Family Advocate’s office must employ 
to conduct the enquiry. Similarly, the Regulations made under the Act do not provide a 
procedure and states only that ‘[t]he Family Advocate shall…institute an enquiry in such 
manner as he may deem expedient or desirable.’265  
The modus operandi of the Family Advocate’s office has become established over the 
years and the accepted practice is that when conducting an enquiry, the Family Advocate will 
conduct interviews with the parents to ascertain their personal circumstances and the details 
of the dispute. The Family Advocate will also interview the child and allow him or her an 
opportunity to be heard. The Family Advocate will record the views of the child in its report 
and will consider them in making a recommendation. The Family Advocate’s office 
maintains that the interview with the child prevents the child from having to appear in 
court.
266
   
As identified by Kassan, ‘the Office of the Family Advocate creates a (limited) 
platform for the views of the child to be heard’267 because the Family Advocate is not obliged 
to include the child’s views in the report for the court. The views of the child will not have an 
overriding effect on the recommendation that Family Advocate will make. ‘The role of the 
family advocate is to make recommendations as to what is the overall best interest of the 
                                                            
265 Regulation 5 on the Regulations made under the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act 24 of 1987, 
Government Gazette 12781 of 3 October 1990. 
266 Office of the Family Advocate http://www.justice.gov.za/FMAdv/f_main.htm (last accessed 29 September 
2013). 
267 Kassan (2004) 57. 
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child. (which may in some instances be contrary to the expressed wishes of the child) Their 
role is not to represent and advocate the wishes or voice of the child.’268  
The court in Soller v G confirmed the role of the Family Advocate as ‘a professional 
and neutral channel of communication between the conflicting parents (and perhaps the child) 
and the judicial officer.’269  The court further confirmed that the Family Advocate is not 
appointed as a representative of any party to a dispute – neither the mother, father or the 
child. The Family Advocate’s role is to assist the court by considering all the relevant facts 
and to make a balanced recommendation. The Family Advocate must approach all matters in 
a neutral fashion in order that the wishes and desires of disputing parties can be more closely 
examined and the true facts and circumstances ascertained.
270
  
It is imperative that the Family Advocate be absolutely independent to ensure that the 
recommendations it makes cannot be attacked due to a lack of impartiality. The court will 
make its decision based on best interests of the child bearing in mind the Family Advocate’s 
report and recommendations.
271
 In any case, however, a court is permitted to reject the 
Family Advocate’s report in toto or to accept the factual findings yet make an order that 
materially differs from the Family Advocate’s recommendations.272 
It has been pointed out that in many instances, where the Family Advocate 
investigates and makes a recommendation incorporating the views of the child (presuming 
the child is mature enough to express their views) this will suffice and the child’s interests 
                                                            
268 Kassan (2004) 57. 
269 Soller v G and Another 2003 (5) SA 430 (W) par 27. 
270 Soller NO v G par 23. 
271 Skelton (2008) 224. See I v S 2000 (2) SA 993 (C) where the court found that it could not follow the Family 
Advocate’s recommendation in that case.  
272 Van den Berg v Le Roux [2003] 3 All SA 599 (NC) 606-610.  In this matter counsel for applicant  (with 
counsel for the respondent concurring) requested that the family advocate should recues herself on the basis that 
she had been accused of bias by the respondent in an earlier complaint made in writing to the office of the 
Family Advocate, and that during the hearing she had to cross-examine the respondent.  
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will be properly taken care of.
273
 However, the court’s investigations are frequently 
superficial and inadequate.
274
 This is not necessarily due to lack of skill or knowledge but can 
be attributed to the fact that the Family Advocate’s Office carry high caseloads and are 
under-resourced.
275
 
In addition to resource constraints, the variety of difficulties that are associated with 
the effective communicating with presiding officers on behalf of children should not be 
underestimated.
276
 Based on the research of Pillay and Zaal, courts should be cautious in 
assuming that the Family Advocates are best placed to accurately convey the views and 
concerns of child. Further, they indicate that there is additional research data to the effect that 
there is no guarantee that Family Advocates will place much emphasis on ensuring that the 
court has a full understanding of the child’s views, even where Family Advocates are 
correctly apprised of these views and concerns.
277
 
Presently, courts rely heavily upon the reports and recommendations of the Family 
Advocate and family counsellor to place the views and wishes of children before the court in 
a neutral and accurate manner. As has been shown, there are many difficulties in the 
functioning of the Family Advocate’s office that make such reliance problematic. There is 
                                                            
273 Skelton (2008) 224. 
274 Carnelley (2010) 641. 
275 See Brown v Abrahams (2004) 1 All SA 401 where the court notes ‘the severe resource constraints presently 
impeding the proper functioning of the Office of the Family Advocate…’ (424C-D). 
276 Pillay and Zaal (2005) 689.  
277 Pillay and Zaal (2005) 689. In a study conducted by the second author of that article in 2002, it was found 
‘that only 22.5 per cent of family advocates placed strong emphasis on conveying and asserting the wishes of 
children to courts , because the majority of them saw their primary responsibility as one of revealing and 
advocating what they considered to be in the best interests of children or other parties’.  See Zaal N (2003) 
‘Hearing the Voices of Children in Court: A Field Study and Evaluation’ in Burman S (ed) The Fate of the 
Child – Legal Decisions on Children in the new South Africa Juta & Co, Ltd: Cape Town. See also Pillay R, 
‘The custody evaluation process at the Durban office of the Family Advocate: An Analysis of the criteria used 
by family counsellors in the drafting of assessment reports’ (unpublished mini-dissertation: Interdisciplinary 
Masters Degree in Child Care and Protection, University of Durban – Westville).  Pillay L’s study conducted in 
2003, and it was found that in  44 per cent of reports by family counsellors  reviewed there was expressly 
mentioned that the wishes of the children involved was a factor influencing their recommendation. Further it 
was found that in the 44 per cent of reports that mentioned  children’s views, their comments were seldom 
quoted verbatim but almost always rephrased or interpreted. The findings indicate that family counsellor’s 
reports provided courts ‘with only a somewhat muted synthesized impression of the voices of children.’ 
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sufficient empirical data to suggest that the Family Advocates system frequently fails to 
maintain the participatory rights of children as required by article 12 of the CRC and Article 
4(2) of the African Charter.
278
  
3. OTHER PARTICIPATION PROCEDURES AVAILABLE TO CHILDREN 
INVOLVED IN OR AFFECTED BY FAMILY LAW MATTERS 
3.1 Expert Reports  
An issue that also demands consideration is whether reports by social workers or 
psychologists or their evidence in court is indeed an adequate manner to place the child’s 
views before the court for consideration. Undoubtedly the most common way of placing 
children’s views before the court, this indirect method of participation has its advantages for 
children but is also subject to some criticism.     
3.1.1 The Role of the Expert  
The court in Stock v Stock explained the role of an expert witness as follows: 
An expert in the field of psychology or psychiatry who is asked to testify in a case concerning 
the custody, or variation of a custody order, or children, a case in which difficult emotional, 
intellectual and psychological problems arise within the family, must be made to understand 
that he is there to assist the Court. If he is to be helpful he must be neutral. The evidence of 
such a witness is of little value where he, or she, is partisan and consistently asserts the cause 
of the party who calls him.279 
Section 62 of the Children’s Act is the only provision in the Children’s Act which 
makes provision for the appointment of an expert in children’s matters.  In terms of the 
                                                            
278 Pillay and Zaal (2005) 690. Pillay and Zaal contend that ’in order to supplement the second-hand and 
sometimes incomplete evidence relating to the views of children conveyed by family advocates, presiding 
officers in divorce cases need an additional source of information that will provide them with a direct 
impression of these views .’ 
279  1981 (3) SA 1280 (A) at 1296E-F. See also Jackson v Jackson 2002 (2) SA 303 (SCA)  311F-G, 323E-324C 
and 327G-333I) and Gentiruco v Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd 1972 1 (SA) 589 (A). 
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provision, the Children’s Court may, for the purposes of deciding any issue before it, order 
that a designated social worker, family advocate, psychologist, medical practitioner or other 
suitably qualified person may carry out an investigation to establish the circumstances of the 
child, the parent or parents, a person who has parental responsibilities and rights in respect of 
the child etc. A person who is subject to such an investigation may also obtain supplementary 
evidence or reports from other suitably qualified persons.
280
 As the Children’s Court is 
empowered to deal with parental responsibilities and rights disputes, these provisions will 
find application in those family law matters as well. Although section 62 specifically has 
application to proceedings in the Children’s Court, expert reports are widely used in other 
courts as well though it is not provided for in legislation.   
The Supreme Court of Appeal seems to have indicated its preference for the wishes of 
the child to be placed before the court indirectly, via expert evidence. A case that has 
confirmed the position with regard to the admissibility of expert evidence and 
recommendations from the Family Advocate is P v P .
281
  The Family Advocate at the 
instance of the Appellant was requested to investigate the best interest of the children in this 
matter. The Family Advocate in turn appointed a social worker and family counsellor, to 
conduct an investigation into the best interest of the child and also engaged the services of a 
clinical psychologist, to undertake a psychological assessment of the children.  
The Supreme Court of Appeal noted that the Family Advocate’s opinion was based 
almost exclusively on the recommendations in the reports submitted to her by the experts she 
appointed. The lack of objectivity was highlighted by Chetty J 
282
 and the appeal court noted 
that some of the experts’ attitude was indeed unfortunate as the task of an expert is to assist 
                                                            
280 Section 62(2) of the Children’s Act.  
281  2007 (5) SA 94 (SCA). 
282 The appeal court noted that the family counselor in cross-examination strenuously defended her position and 
was unwilling to make any concessions in favour of the Respondent, which indicated her lack of objectivity. It 
should further also be noted that when the children’s preferences was put to these expert witnesses under cross-
examination, they were still unwilling to reconsider their opinion. (para 21) 
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the court in an objective manner.
283Chetty J pointed out that ‘it is clear that the expert opinion 
is not mere conjecture, surmise or speculation of the expert: it is his judgement in a matter of 
fact. It is equally clear, that whilst in many cases a court needs and benefit from an expert’s 
opinion, the expert witness should not usurp the function of the court.’284 The appeal court 
concluded that Chetty J did not question the special knowledge, training or experience of the 
various expert witnesses, but identified his main problem with such experts as their inability 
to draw a line between matters of fact and matters of value thereby distorting the judicial 
process by acting like judges.
285
  
This case also highlights the important principle of good faith, which entails that 
‘each person that participates in litigation to present the court with all relevant facts, negative 
and positive, so that the court could come to the right conclusion and therefore a decision, 
based on correct fact.’286 
3.1.2 The Advantages and Disadvantages of Expert Reports as a form Participation 
The elements that make expert investigations and reports a meaningful method of 
participation include:  
 Professional knowledge and special skills: In various common law jurisdictions, 
including Australia, this indirect method of informing the court of the child’s views is 
favoured above a judge interviewing a child directly.
287
 Social workers and mental 
health professionals possess the specific knowledge and expertise to enable children 
to ensure that children’s real views are elicited and placed before the court. Experts 
                                                            
283 Par 11. 
284 Par 16. 
285 Par 17.  
286 de Ru H (2008) ‘Family Law: The Value of the Recommendations made by the Family Advocate and 
Evidence by Expert Witnesses in Determining the best Interests of a Child: P v P 2007 (5) SA 94 (SCA)’ 48(2) 
Codicillus  71. 
287 Cashmore J & Parkinson P (2007) ‘What Responsibility Do Courts Have to Hear Children’s Voices?’ 15 
International Journal of Children’s Rights 49.  
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are also required to interpret the child’s views and apply his or her professional 
knowledge to the situation. An expert report can be very helpful to the court and 
persuasive.
288
  
 Specifically trained to speak to children: An expert report gives the child the 
benefit of speaking with someone who is specifically trained to communicate with 
children in stressful situations.
289
 
 Builds a relationship of trust with the child: The expert may conduct several 
interviews with the child over a period of time and will establish a rapport with the 
child. Interviews are also done in a more relaxed setting away from the court which 
may reduce stress and pressure on the child. In such a setting the child is more likely 
to reveal his or her true feelings. It has also been pointed out that by conducting 
several interviews, the expert can ascertain whether the child’s views are consistent or 
varies depending on the immediate circumstances.
290
 
 Places the child’s views in context and can be cross-examined with regard to 
observations and interpretations made: As pointed out by Doogue and Blackwell: 
‘[The expert can] comment on their observations of the behavioural nuances of stress, 
anxiety, and so-forth. The advantage for the Court in this being the method [for 
ascertaining the child’s views] is that this person is able to give evidence and can be 
                                                            
288 In I v S 2000 (2) SA 993 (C)  the two children expressed their view not to have regular contact with their 
father to a psychiatrist and the family advocate. The court rejected the family Advocate’s recommendation and 
upheld the wishes of the children as recommended in the psychiatrist’s report. See also Meyer v Gerber 1999 (3) 
SA 550 (O), where  the court did not speak to the parties’ 15-year-old son but took the boys preferences into 
account which were illustrated in a letter the child wrote to his mother, two affidavits, reports from the Family 
Advocate and two psychological reports. 
289 Tapp P (2006) ‘Judges are Human too: Conversation Between the Judge and a Child as a Means of Giving 
Effect to Section 6 of the Care of the Children Act 2004’ New Zealand Law Review 39. 
290 Bala (2004) ‘Assessments for Post-Separation Parenting Dispute in Canada’ 42 Family Court Review 490 as 
cited in Tapp P (2006) ‘Judges are Human too: Conversation Between the Judge and a Child as a Means of 
Giving Effect to Section 6 of the Care of the Children Act 2004’ New Zealand Law Review 39. 
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subjected to cross-examination on their evidence, thus providing accountability for 
the views they have expressed on the child’s behalf.’291 
Cross-examination on the reasons for the child’s views and the child’s demeanour 
meets the parents’ due process rights and makes it more likely that the parents will 
accept the decision.
292
  
Criticisms of placing the views of children before court through  a third party expert report 
include the following: 
 Children’s views are filtered and reinterpreted: There is noteworthy research 
which indicate that children are unhappy with the filtering or reinterpretation that can 
occur when their views are conveyed to court indirectly.
293
 
 Interview fatigue: The Committee on the Rights of the Child point out that the use of 
expert assessments and reports must be limited where ever possible  and emphasizes 
that in ‘hearing’ a child ‘that a child should not be interviewed more than necessary, 
in particular when harmful events are explored. The “hearing” of a child is a difficult 
process that can have a traumatic impact on the child.’294 In the matter of J v J295 the 
child had been the subject of a long line of litigation between his parents. In addition, 
the child had been repeatedly subjected to psychological assessment. The child had 
complained to the psychologist that he was not a ‘lab rat’ to be subjected to 
continuous testing. The judge gave considerable attention to the child’s wishes and 
ordered that the child be allowed to settle down without further litigation, assessment 
and investigation’. 
                                                            
291 Doogue and Blackwell (2000) ‘How Do We Best Serve Children in Proceedings in the Family Court?’ 
Butterworths Family Law Journal 193-203 as cited in Tapp (2006) 39. 
292 Tapp (2006) 72.  
293 Tapp (2006) 39. 
294 General Comment No. 12 (2009) 10.  
295 2008 (6) SA 30 (C). 
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 Conflicting reports: The evidence of expert witnesses can constitute valuable 
contributions to disputed family law matters but not always conclusively. Parties often 
present expert evidence directly opposing the conclusion of the other.
296
  Such 
conflicting reports may lead to protracted court proceedings.  
 Whether children’s views are correctly placed before the court depends largely 
on the quality of the expert report: In Hlope v Mahlalela
297
 the court noted the 
inadequacy of the  psychologist’s report, but the court did not suggest further 
investigation. However in B v P
298
 the court specifically ordered that the child be re-
interviewed so that her wishes could be more accurately ascertained. 
The recommendations of expert witnesses are meant be of assistance to the court in 
determining the best interests if the child. The courts are not bound to accept these 
recommendations. As has been pointed out, this confirms the independence of a presiding 
officer and, in a broader context the judiciary.
299
  
3.2 Judicial Interviews 
There has been an ongoing debate regarding the wisdom of judges speaking to children in 
family law proceedings. Only in exceptional cases will the child be heard directly by the 
judge, or as a witness in court.
300
 The choice of a judge to speak to a child directly is entirely 
                                                            
296 See eg. Van Pletzen v Van Pletzen 1998 (4) SA 95 (O) 97D-E and Ex Parte Crichfield 1999 (3) SA 132 (W) 
137I-J.  
297 1998 (1) SA 449 (T) 
298 1999(4) SA 113 (T) 
299 de Ru (2008) 71. 
300 However, in  Hlophe v Mahlalela  1998 (1) SA 449 (T) (custody dispute between father and maternal 
grandparents) the child of eleven years old was called as a witness and the counsel for applicant only posed one 
question to her: ‘where would you prefer to stay?’ to which she replied ‘with my grandparents’. Putting the child 
in such a position was undoubtedly very stressful, traumatic and unfair that she had to make such a choice in the 
presence of all the parties. What is worse is that Van den Heever J proceeds to state that for reasons apparent 
from his judgment he will not take any cognisance of the child’s expressed preference. It is submitted that there 
is nothing apparent from this judgment that would justify the way in which this child views was elicited and 
then dismissed. 
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a matter of judicial discretion. In the event that a judge does decide to see the child it will 
usually be in the judge’s chambers, without having the child sworn as a witness.301 
 It is submitted that circumstances which may urge a judge to speak directly to a child 
include, where the children asked to see the  judge, where it is suspected that the child has 
been influenced or systematically alienated,
302
 where parents are engaged in an intractable 
dispute
303
 and where there is conflicting expert opinions.  
The following are some of the benefits both a judge and the child may derive from this 
process: 
 Provides a further participation option for the child: The more participation 
procedures are available for the child to choose from, the more likely it becomes that 
the child’s real views are placed before the court. The child also has the option to 
choose the method that is the most comfortable for him or her.   
 Informative for judge: The court will be able to compare the report of the Family 
Advocate and other expert reports with its own interview with the minor child in order 
to reach a well-informed decision with regard to the care and contact rights relating to 
the minor child 
  Empowering for chid:. Judges have also indicated that they have gained much 
insight in meeting children face to face and usually information comes to the fore 
which had not been disclosed before.
304
 
 Better understanding of the child and intensity of views: One of the major benefits 
of judicial interviews that has been indicated is that the judge can get an appreciation 
                                                            
301 Bala N, Lee K, Lindsay R and Talwar V (2010) ‘The Competence of Children to Testify: Psychological 
Research Informing Canadian Law Reform’ 18 International Journal of Children’s Rights 53 Fn 1.  
302 Raitt F (2007) ‘Hearing Children in Family Law Proceedings: Can Judges make a Difference?’ 19 Child and 
Family Law Quarterly 206. 
303 Raitt (2007) 208. 
304 Raitt (2007) 217.  
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of the strength with which the child hold his or her views, more so than just reading a 
report.
305
 The judge can gain a first hand impression of the child’s maturity, which is 
a factor to be taken into consideration when deciding the weight to be attached to the 
child’s views.306  
 Confirm previous expressed views: Evidence presented in court and cross-
examination may have cast doubt on whether the child’s views remain current. ‘A 
conversation with the child after the evidence has been led may ensure that the judge 
has the most up-to-date and relevant information.’307 
  Different possible solutions come to the fore: It has also been noted that children 
can come up with solutions no one else has thought of and which are more workable.  
For example in Kleynhans v Kleynhans and Another
308
 the conflicting opinions of the 
experts lead to the father bringing an application to have the dispute resolved by oral 
evidence. What is of significance in this case is that a major reason for the dismissal 
of the application was because the children had on several occasions already 
suggested an acceptable solution to the impasse that had been reached in their parent’s 
ongoing dispute regarding their father’s contact with them.  
 Measure likely impact of decision:  Before the decision is made the judge might 
have a conversation with the child to estimate the likely impact of going against  a 
child’s firmly held wishes. The purpose should not be to persuade the child but to 
obtain a better sense of whether ordering a parenting arrangement which goes against 
the wishes of a child is likely to work.
309
 
                                                            
305 Raitt (2007) 207. 
306 Cashmore & Parkinson (2007) 52. In McCall v McCall 1994 (3) SA 201 (CPD). The judge found the boy to 
be intelligent, articulate, persuasive, sincere and candid who displayed a degree of maturity and intellectual 
development that satisfied him that the child is capable of forming and expressing an intelligent and informed 
judgment on what he subjectively perceives to be in his best interest. (208B) 
307 Tapp (2006) 61. Cashmore & Parkinson (2007) 53. 
308 (2009) JOL 24013 (ECP). 
309 Cashmore & Parkinson (2007) 53. 
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 Direct access to decision-maker: Having direct access to the decision maker can be 
very powerful for children and it has been indicated that the process of being listened 
to could well be as important to children than the actual outcome.
310
  
 Judge can assess the reasonableness of the submissions made by the parties: 
Where there are conflicting opinions regarding the child’s capacity to express his 
views or major disputes of fact, interviewing the child would allow the judge to assess 
the reasonableness of the submissions by made on behalf of the parties.
311
  
The following are criticisms of judges conducting judicial interviews and risks and 
difficulties faced by judges considering using this method of participation: 
 Inadequacy of training of judges to communicate with children:  It has been 
argued that a ‘judge does not have the necessary skill to facilitate a child’s 
communication on sensitive matters, to provide the child with support when the child 
expresses views that they feel are disloyal to a parent, or to understand the nuances of 
a child’s communication.’312 
 The limitation of a once-off interview: ‘A judge does not have the time to establish 
the relationship of trust that is usually required before a child will reveal their views 
on matters important to them and their family.’313 
 Child is subjected to yet another interview: It has been held that where a child has 
been interviewed by various persons and has persisted with the same view, it would 
‘insensitive’ to subject the child to further interviews, well knowing that it is unlikely 
that the child will change his mind.
314
   
                                                            
310 Raitt (2007) 209.  
311 See in this regard Family Advocate v R (Unreported) case number 2004/2012 Eastern Cape High Court – Port 
Elizabeth. 
312 Tapp (2006) 62. 
313 Tapp (2006) 62.  
314 Meyer v Gerber 1999 (3) SA 550 (O) at (656C). 
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 Speaking to a judge may be intimidating to a child: In F v F the court observed 
that if the child ‘found interactions with professionals (who are trained in child 
psychology and possess the requisite skill and sensitivity to conduct the relevant 
enquiry) daunting, it is then only logical to expect an encounter with five strange 
judges, ill-equipped to deal with the situation, to be thoroughly intimidating.’315 The 
child may be so intimidated by the judge that he or she becomes withdrawn.  
 Speaking to a judge may impose a burden of responsibility on children: Children 
may carry a sense of responsibility in circumstances of family break-up regardless of 
whether their views are explicitly sought.
316
 A child, unaware how much weight was 
actually attached to his views, may feel responsible for the ultimate decision. It has 
been argued that most children do not want to determine or be responsible for the 
outcome.
317
 
 There are of course many opponents against the direct involvement of children in 
litigation in this way. De Jong argues that ‘it is generally accepted that the adversarial system 
of litigation is just too hostile, too confrontational, too formal and too intricate and that direct 
involvement in such a system may have dangerous repercussions for the children.’318  
Any judge having a conversation with a child must be aware of the risks and difficulties 
as well as the benefits. It is argued that such conversations are not a substitute for expert 
interview and evaluation of the family dynamic. Nevertheless these conversations can be a 
useful complement to the report of an expert.
319
 It is argued that the difficulties inherent in 
this process can be overcome by judges ‘but it does take a serious degree of purpose, will and 
                                                            
315 2006 (3) SA 42 (SCA) par 25-26. 
316 Raitt (2007) 214.  
317 Cashmore & Parkinson (2007) 53. 
318 De Jong M (2008) ‘Giving Children a Voice in Family Separation Issues: A Case for Mediation’ 4 Tydskrif 
vir Suid- Afrikaanse Reg 787. 
319 Cashmore & Parkinson (2007) 54.  
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creativity to tackle them.’320 It is submitted that judges should not hesitate to apply their 
discretion to speak directly to children if they are of the opinion that the circumstances call 
for such intervention and see it in the best interest of the child.  
4. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS  
It has been argued that a ‘child’s very competence to form and express a view’ may 
depend on the procedural participation opportunities provided.’321 The available procedures 
could enhance or inhibit the child’s ability to and express a view. A supportive and 
empowering environment to discuss and consider the available participation options may also 
have an effect on the child’s ability.322  
It is submitted that children in family law matters need to be informed from the outset of 
the process, and during it, of the participation options which are available to them. They must 
be given appropriate information about the process and informed about what to expect.
323
 
Each participation method has its advantages and disadvantages. The appointment of 
a SLR may raise concerns that the child is placed in difficult position because the child may 
be in direct conflict with the parents or at least one of the parents and the appointment of a 
legal representative may lead to a further protraction of the litigation and costs.
324
 It has been 
argued, however, that in some cases a SLR for the child could be vital in order to allow the 
child a “proper opportunity to express and explain [his] views”.325 
With regard to judicial interviews, court room testimony and the appointment of a 
SLR most argue that these are unsuitable participation methods because these options do not 
                                                            
320 Raitt (2007) 223. 
321 Barratt A (2003) “The Best Interest of the Child”– Where is the Child’s Voice?’ in Burman S (ed) The Fate 
of the Child: Legal Decisions on Children in the new South Africa Juta & Co, Ltd: Cape Town 153. 
322 Barrat (2003) 153. 
323 Cashmore & Parkinson (2007) 55.  
324 Van Heerden Boberg’s Law of Persons and the Family (1999) 542. 
325 Van Heerden (1999) 542.  
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provide the ‘supportive environment best suited to a nuanced treatment of the child’s voice or 
maximising the child’s ability to participate.’326  
Further, with regard to judicial interviews, the South African cultural context must be 
kept in mind. African culture dictates that a child must have respect for their elders. Kaime 
notes that: 
‘[I]n many African traditional societies, the autonomy of the child is often heavily 
constrained. Notions of child and childhood are generally premised on the idea that it is only 
adults that know what is best for children. From an early age, children are taught to defer and 
revere the elderly’.327 
A judge speaking directly with a child may then prove to be of very limited benefit 
because the child could either clamp up due to intimidation or fear or the child may just agree 
with any observations by the judge, once again in the fear that any dissent will be seen as 
disrespectful. 
For some children being interviewed by trained professionals might be appropriate for 
them to have a true opportunity to be heard. However, the cost of such practitioners is 
unaffordable to many parties, and private practitioners may only be available to the 
wealthy.
328
  
The child’s development, social, economic and cultural environment will all have an 
impact on how the child expresses him- or herself.
329
 The circumstances of each case should, 
therefore dictate what participation method or methods should be adopted. However, due 
                                                            
326 Barrat (2003) 154. 
327 Kaime T (2005) ‘The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the cultural legitimacy of children’s rights 
in Africa: Some reflections’ 5 African Human Right Law Journal 231.  
328 Barrat (2003) 154. 
329 Barrat (2003) 153. 
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regard should be given to the age of the child, the nature of the decision being made, the 
forum, the type and quality of the representation available, and the available state resources.  
  It is submitted that courts tend to gloss over procedural issues
330
. It has been shown 
that the quality of the participation methods is of crucial importance. It is further submitted 
that a combination of the procedures might be the best solution for both the child and the 
court.
331
  
5. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS332  
It is submitted that looking at the Australian experience and methods of placing children’s 
views before the court could inform the South African participation landscape. Australia’s 
family law structures may be more developed than South Africa’s, but the underlying 
principles of the two systems are very similar. A comparison between these two systems, 
therefore, seems appropriate. 
5.1 Legal Landscape and Legislative Framework 
The Family Court of Australia was established as a specialist court in 1976. The court 
is a superior court which deals with more complex matters. The Federal Magistrates Court is 
a faster, cheaper and simpler forum for the resolution of family law disputes. The Australian 
                                                            
330 Barrat (2003) 154. 
331 Family Advocate v B (2007) 1 All SA 602 (SE) mother (abductor) and child had been subjects of three 
comprehensive reports which deal intrinsically with the child’s well-being. (i) report by family counsellor 
engaged to conduct “an investigation regarding the social circumstances of mother and child; (ii) a report by a 
curator ad litem appointed by the court to represent the child in these proceedings, “to report to this Court on the 
best interest of the child”; (iii) a medico-legal psychological assessment compiled psychologist at the bequest of 
the curator ad litem.   
332 This section will be based on the findings of a survey undertaken in 2009 under the auspices of Childwatch 
International Research Network. The study has been identified as the first study to examine children’s 
participation across different international family law contexts. At the time the findings was published South 
Africa had indicated that did intend to complete the survey. The Child & Youth Research & Training 
Programme, which is a South African Childwatch International Associated Institution, would complete the 
survey. At the time of writing, it was unclear whether South Africa has indeed completed the survey. Newell S, 
Graham A & Fitzgerald R ‘Results of an International Survey Regarding Children’s Participation in Decision-
Making Following Parental Separation’, Report to Childwatch International Research Network’s Children and 
the Law Thematic Study Group, (Australia: Centre for Children and Young People, Southern Cross University, 
November 2009). 
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family law system is strongly in favour of resolving disputes by private agreement between 
parents and only 6% of cases require judicial determination.
333
 
The Family Law Act 1975 provides for the resolution of disputes concerning children 
following divorce. Taylor et al. point out that this legislation does not specifically mention  
the child’s right to have their views heard and taken into account.334 However, when a court 
determines what is in the child’s best interests, the court must consider ‘any views expressed 
by the child and any factors (such as the child’s maturity or level of understanding) that the 
court thinks are relevant to the weight it should give to the child’s views’.335  
In determining the best interests of the child the court must take into account the 
‘primary considerations’ in section 60CC, which are (1) the benefit to the child of having a 
meaningful relationship with both his or her parents; and (2) the need to protect the child 
from physical and psychological harm and  being subjected or exposed to abuse, neglect or 
family violence.
336
 The view expressed by the child is included as an ‘additional’ 
consideration. Taylor et al. observe that this classification if the child’s views as an 
‘additional consideration’ ‘overlooks the importance of the children’s views and is 
inconsistent with the intention of the CRC which emphasises participation rights as being 
foundational to the decision-making process.’337  
5.2  Methods of Participation 
                                                            
333 Newell et al. (2009) 7. In terms of Section 60I of the Family Act 1975, Family Dispute Resolution is 
compulsory in all matters before parties may proceed to have the matter resolved by the court.  
334 Taylor N, Fitzgerald R, Morag T, Bajpai A and Graham A (2012) ‘International Models of Child 
Participation in Family Law Proceedings following Parental Separation / Divorce’ 20 International Journal of 
Children’s Rights 654. See Russell & Russell & Another(2009) FamCA 28 (22 January 2009) where court 
held that the child’s expressed views on his or her welfare must be considered together with any other factor 
relevant to the weight to be attached to those views.   
335 Section 60CC(3)(a). 
336 Section 60CC(2A) requires that in applying the primary considerations, the court must give greater weight to 
this consideration. 
337 Taylor et al. (2012) 655. 
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Children participate in Australian family law matters in a number of ways. Carnelley 
points out that like South Africa, Australia has taken a more protected stance, avoiding that 
children are directly involved in litigation between their parents.
338
  Section 60CD of the Act 
sets out how a child’s views are to be expressed. In terms of that section, the court may 
inform itself of a child’s views by having regard to anything contained in a report given to the 
court under section 62G(2); by making an order under section 68L for the child’s interest in 
proceedings to be independently represented by a lawyer; or subject to applicable Rules of 
Court, by such other means as the court thinks appropriate. These methods will now be 
discussed in more detail.   
5.2.1 Family Reports 
Children have their views most commonly heard through the Family Report.
339
 The 
Family Law Act makes it clear that a family consultant who is directed to give the court a 
report must ascertain the views of the child in relation to the matter and must include the 
views of the child on that matter in the report.
340
  A family consultant need not obtain a 
child’s views if doing so would be inappropriate because of the child’s age or maturity or 
some other special circumstance.
341
 Family consultants are usually psychologists and/or 
social workers who specialise in child and family issues after separation and divorce.
342
  
5.2.2 Judicial Interviews 
                                                            
338 Carnelley (2010) 656. Although section 65C(b) provides that children can also apply for a parenting order 
directly. 
339 Section 62G(2). 
340 Section 62G (3A). My emphasis. 
341 Section 62G(3B). 
342 Commission for Children and Young People and Child Guardian – ‘The Representation of Children and 
Young People’s Views in Australian Family Law Decision Making: A Discussion Paper’ available at 
http://www.ccypcg.qld.gov.au/resources/publications/archived-papers.html (last accessed 31 October 2013) 
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On rare occasions, the judge will speak directly to a child in chambers. Judges seem 
to be reluctant to interview children for reasons similar to those discussed above
343
, even 
though such an interview is only possible with the permission of the child.
344
 
A case that has illustrated how well judicial interviews can work in practice is Painter 
v Morley.
345
 Four children were given the opportunity to express their views directly to the 
Court. The interview took place in a courtroom in the presence family consultant, counsel for 
the Independent Children’s Lawyer and the judge. The family consultant posed the questions 
to the children by asking them to confirm what they said to the family consultant in the last 
family report. The children were informed that they did not have to be in court if they did not 
want to; they did not have to express any view and there would be no difficulties if they did 
not do so; that the decision was made by the Judge and not the children; and that it was 
simply an opportunity to ascertain their views if they wished to give them. At the conclusion 
of the interview, the family reporter gave evidence of what had occurred and what was said. 
The interview was recorded and a transcript of the interview was also available to the Court 
and the parties. 
5.2.3 Independent Children’s Lawyer 
While no right exists to independent representation for children in family law disputes, it 
is common for children to be appointed a lawyer in complex cases.
346
 If is appears to the 
court that the child’s interests in the proceedings ought to be independently represented by a 
lawyer, the court may order that the child’s interests in the proceedings are independently 
represented by a lawyer.
347
 The court may order the appointment of an independent 
                                                            
343 See par 3.2. 
344 Carnelley (2010) 665.  
345 [2007] FamCA 283. 
346 Carnelley (2010) 665. 
347 Section 68L(2). My emphasis. 
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representative on its own initiative, by application of the child or an organisation concerned 
with the welfare of children or any other person.
348
  
5.2.3.1 The circumstances which would require the appointment of a ICL 
In the matter of Re K Appeal,
349
 the court identified the circumstances which would 
require the appointment of a ICL: 
 presence of allegations of child abuse ,whether it be physical, sexual or psychological 
abuse;  
 if a child of mature years is expressing strong views, the giving of effect to which 
would involve changing a long standing custodial arrangement or a complete denial of 
access to one parent; 
 intractable conflict between the parents;  
 the child is apparently alienated from one or both parents;  
 real issues of cultural or religious differences affecting the child;  
 the sexual preference of either or both parents or some other person having significant 
contact with the child are likely to impinge upon the child’s welfare;  
 the conduct of either or both parents or some other person having significant contact 
with the child is alleged to be anti-social to the extent that it seriously impinges on the 
child’s welfare;  
 there are issues of significant medical, psychiatric or psychological illness or 
personality disorder in relation to either party or a child or other persons having 
significant contact with the children;  
 on the material filed by the parents, neither seems a suitable custodian; 
                                                            
348 Section 68L(4). 
349 (1994) FamCA 21. 
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  one of the parties proposes that the child will either be permanently removed from 
the jurisdiction or permanently removed to such a place within the jurisdiction as to 
greatly restrict or for all practical purposes exclude the other party from the possibility 
of access to the child; 
 Cases where it is proposed to separate siblings or;  
 Cases where none of the parties are legally represented.  
The court may make an order for the purpose of allowing the lawyer who is to represent 
the child’s interests to find out what the child’s views are on the matters to which the 
proceedings relate.
350
 Obtaining the child’s views is again limited if it would be inappropriate 
because of the child’s age or maturity.351 The Family Law Act emphasises that a person 
cannot require a child to express his or her views in relation to any matter.
352
 The Guidelines 
provide for the practical implementation of this provision and states that ‘[a] child who is 
unwilling to express a view must not be pressured to do so and must be reassured that it is his 
or her right not to express a view even where another member of the sibling group does want 
to express a view.’353 
5.2.3.2 The Role of the ICL 
The Family Law Act proceeds to elaborate on the role of the independent children’s 
lawyer (ICL). The Act starts off by discussing the general nature of role of independent 
children’s lawyer. The ICL must form an independent view of what is in the best interests of 
the child, based on the evidence available to him or her and must act in relation to 
                                                            
350 Section 68L(5). 
351 Section 68L(6). 
352 Section 60CE. 
353 Guidelines for The Independent Children’s Lawyers (6 December 2007) 4 available at 
http://www.familylawcourts.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/FLC/Home/Children's+Matters/Independent+Childrens+
Lawyer/ (hereinafter “Guidelines for the ICLs”). 
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proceedings in what he or she believes to be in the best interests of the child.
354
 The Act 
makes it very clear that the ICL is not the child’s legal representative and is not obliged to act 
on the child’s instructions.355  The Australian system therefore only makes provision for a 
best interest legal representative.
356
 
The Guidelines specifies that although the ICL does not take instructions, he is ‘required 
to ensure the Court is fully informed of the child’s views, in an admissible form…’.357 The 
Guidelines also requires the ICL to explain his role to the child and specifically provides for 
the situation ‘where a child of sufficient maturity wishes to have a direct representative who 
will act on the child’s instructions, the ICL should inform the child of the possibility of 
applying to become a party to the proceedings.’358  
‘The ICL must be truly independent of the court and the parties to the proceedings.’ The 
ICL must be ‘…unfettered by the considerations other than the best interests of the child.’359 
The Guidelines go into detail about how the ICL should handle the situation where the best 
interests of the child and the child’s expressed views does not coincide. If the evidence 
indicates that the child’s best interests will be served by an order that is contrary to the child’s 
views the ICL must follow the following course of action: (1) the ICL must advise the child 
that he or she intends to make submissions to court contrary to the child’s views; (2) he or she 
must assure the child that his or her views are indeed before the court and arguments will be 
made to support the adoption of those views; (3) the ICL must make submissions in support 
of the best interest of the child; (4) The ICL must provide clear reasons why the child’s views 
does not promote the best interests of the child; (5) if there was not an opportunity prior to the 
                                                            
354 Section 68LA(2). 
355 Section 68LA(4). 
356 See par 2.1.2.1.2 above.  
357Guidelines for the ICLs 2. 
358 Guidelines for the ICLs 3. 
359 Guidelines for the ICLs 2. 
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conclusion of the proceedings, explain to the child at conclusion of the proceedings why he or 
she made submissions that were contrary to the child’s views.360 
The Act goes on to state the specific duties of the ICL, which includes the ICL must: 
(a) Act impartially when dealing with the parties to the proceedings; 
(b) Ensure that any views expressed by the child in relation to the matters to which the 
proceedings relate are fully put before the court; 
(c) Identify those matters in reports and other documents that the ICL considers to be 
the most significant for determining the best interests of the child and ensure that the 
court’s attention is drawn to those matters; 
(d) Endeavour to minimise the trauma the child experiences in relation to the 
proceedings; 
(e) Facilitate settlement of the matter to the extent to which doing so is in the best 
interests of the child.
361
 
The ICL has a wide discretion in how the case is managed and the involvement of the 
child in the case. The Guidelines indicate that the following factors must be considered to 
establish the appropriate degree of involvement by the child in an individual case: 
 ‘the extent to which the child wishes to be involved; and  
 The extent that is appropriate for the child having regard to the child’s age, 
developmental level, cognitive abilities, emotional state and views.’362  
                                                            
360 Guidelines for the ICLs 5. See in this regard H v W (1995) FLC 92-598, where the Full Court of the Family 
Court discussed determining the best interest of the child and taking children’s views into account. Baker J 
states: ’a child’s wishes must not only be considered, but must be shown to have been considered, in the reasons 
for the judgment of the trial judge. Furthermore, if the trial judge decides to reject the wishes of a child, then 
clear & cogent reasons for such a rejection must be given particularly if, as in this case, the separate 
representative submits that the Court should give effect to such wishes.’ At 81,961. 
361 Section 68LA (5). 
362 Guidelines for the ICLs 2.  
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With regard to the confidentiality of disclosures of the child to the ICL, the Act provides 
that the ICL is not under an obligation to disclose to the court and cannot be required to 
disclose to the court any information that the child communicates to him or her.
363
 The ICL  
may disclose information communicated to him or her by the child to the court, if the ICL 
considers that the disclosure to be in the child’s best interests.364 The ICL may make such a 
disclosure even if it is made against the wishes of the child.
365
 The Guidelines for ICL further 
elaborate on this point and requires that ICL to inform the child that he or she will be making 
such a disclosure.
366
  
The Guidelines indicate that the ICL must endeavour to build a relationship of trust and 
respect with the child. The Guidelines, however, also caution against the risk of the child 
becoming over dependent upon the ICL and advises that the ICL should seek peer or 
professional help in responding to such a situation.
367
 
It has been established that the participation of the ICL has been successfully 
incorporated into the Australian legal process.
368
 The ICL is well regulated and 
approximately a third of all family law cases decided in courts have a ICL involved.
369
 
6. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION   
The comparison between South Africa and Australia points to the complexity of 
implementing children’s participation rights into practice even where there is legislation 
which provide for such participation. This is supported by the 2009 study
370, ’which 
                                                            
363 Section 68LA(6). 
364 Section 68LA(7). 
365 Section 68LA(8). 
366 Guidelines for the ICLs 3. 
367 Guidelines for the ICLs 3-4. 
368 Carnelley (2010) 660. 
369 Australian Institute of Family Studies http://www.aifs.gov.au/icl/ (last accessed 31 October 2013). 
370 Newell S, Graham A & Fitzgerald R ‘Results of an International Survey Regarding Children’s Participation 
in Decision-Making Following Parental Separation’, Report to Childwatch International Research Network’s 
Children and the Law Thematic Study Group, (Australia: Center for Children and Young People, Southern 
Cross University, November 2009). 
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highlights the need for jurisdictions internationally to continue to develop processes and 
procedures for supporting children to participate and to ensure these are appropriately 
implemented, monitored and evaluated.’371  
While there is no dedicated family court system in South Africa, what is needed is a 
regulated family law  team approach. It is submitted that the first step in establishing such a 
team approach is a comprehensive set of guidelines which set out the role of the separate 
legal representative for the child in relation to the child, the parties and the court.  
South Africa’s Draft LAB372 Guidelines are in many respects similar to the Australian 
Guidelines for ICLs. The Australian Guidelines are very practical and solution focussed 
while South Africa’s Draft LAB Guidelines lack the necessary specificity for proper 
implementation. The Australian Guidelines is user-friendly and makes the role of the ICL in 
relation to the child, the parties and the court very clear.  
It is not argued that South African should adopt the Australian guidelines verbatim, as 
some of the aspects of the Australian guidelines for ICLs would not be relevant or applicable 
to the South African legal landscape. In particular, the Australian legislation only makes 
provision for the appointment of an ICL by the courts. It has been established in South 
African that a legal representative can be appointed by Legal Aid SA without a court order 
and this aspect should be retained.
373
 
The following recommendations are made towards a complete and user-friendly 
guideline for children’s separate legal representatives (SLR) in family law matters: (a) the 
Guidelines must be specific about the skills, qualifications, experience and attributes a SLR 
must have; (b) there must be provision made for an accredited training course the all SLR 
                                                            
371 Taylor et al. (2012) 669. 
372 Legal Aid Board. 
373 Carnelley (2010) 660. 
 
 
 
 
98 
must undergo before he or she may act for a child; (c) it must include detail regarding the 
SLR’s role in relation to the other parties and the court and also the SLR role in pre-trial 
negotiations and trial; (d) there must be more detail regarding the relationship that the SLR 
must endeavour to have with the child; (e) children’s views should be ascertained as early in 
the process as possible, so it must include some clarification regarding the timing of the 
appointment of a SLR; (f) SLR must be given a wide discretion, in consultation with the 
presiding officer, around case management and evidence at trial ; (g) there must be clarity 
that the SLR is a full participant in the proceedings and is entitled to service of all documents; 
(h) there must be provision made for the SLR to interact with other role players involved in 
the process, such as social workers and mental health professionals;  
It has been argued that those children whose wishes have been given serious weight 
were aided by high-quality professional intervention.
374
 ‘Until appropriate mechanisms are 
put in place to ensure the meaningful participation of children, many children will be 
excluded from contributing to those decisions which will have a major impact on the rest of 
their lives.’375 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
374 Barratt (2003) 154. Fn 25. 
375 Barrat (2003) 156. 
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CHAPTER 5 :   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will emphasise the most important conclusions reached in the previous 
chapters. Drawing on those conclusions, this chapter will endeavour to make certain 
recommendations which may ensure that children are given appropriate and adequate 
opportunity to have their voices heard in family law matters affecting them.  
2. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In chapter 2 the aim was to examine the international instruments and regional 
instruments and the how the right to participation was established in the international field. 
The chapter establishes that Article 12(2) relates specifically to the to the right of the 
individual child to participate in judicial and administrative proceedings such as divorces. 
Article 12(1) refers to the right of the child to express his or her views freely in all matters 
affecting him or her. It concluded that the CRC applies to children who are able to form a 
view and the Charter apply to children who are able to communicate their views. The CRC 
and the Charter both have stronger and weaker features but the Charter can be seen as 
confirming global standards contained in the CRC.  
The object of chapter 3 was to examine the legislative framework of children’s right to 
participate in South Africa and to determine whether South Africa’s international obligation 
to implement the right to be heard into domestic legislation has been fulfilled. The further 
aim was to establish whether domestic legislation is in fact sufficient to make the right to 
participate accessible to South African children.  
A key distinction that was made in this chapter was the legal representation of children is 
a form of participation. It was concluded that section 28(1)(h) guided the way for legislature 
to draft enabling legislation which indeed brings international standards into domestic 
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legislation but that further procedural provisions would be useful to ensure that all role 
players know how the legislative provisions should be implemented in practice.  
The aim  of chapter 4 was to look at how domestic legislation had been implemented in 
practice and what methods of participation are currently available for children involved in 
family law disputes in South Africa. The pros and cons of the various available participation 
methods was examined and compared to similar procedures available in Australia. The 
chapter stresses that the circumstances of each case should dictate what participation method 
or methods should be adopted. 
It has been argued that a ‘child’s very competence to form and express a view’ may 
depend on the procedural participation opportunities provided. Further to this point, the 
available procedures could enhance or inhibit the child’s ability to come to and expressing a 
view.
376
 
Chapter 4 concludes that implementation of children’s participation rights into practice in 
South Africa will not improve unless comprehensive guidelines are put in place. It was 
further concluded that what is needed is a team approach in family law matters and that 
children should have not only the choice to participate but must have a choice of options of 
participation methods when they do decide to participate.  
It has been shown that children will choose to disclose their views at different stages and 
to different persons, whether it be the Family Advocate, the independent expert, their legal 
representative or the judge. A one-size-fits-all approach is therefore not feasible. 
3. RECOMMENDATIONS 
While there is no dedicated family court system in South Africa, what is needed is a 
regulated team approach. The approach of the Children’s Court in relations to parental 
                                                            
376 Barrat (2003) 153. 
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responsibilities and rights disputes have taken initial steps in establishing such a team 
approach, by providing for the appointment of a legal representative for the child in section 
55, for the ordering of expert reports in section 62 and specifically emphasising in section 61 
the role of the presiding officer plays in ensuring that children are given an opportunity to 
express their views.  It is recommended that this inquisitorial approach of the Children’s 
Court should be expanded to the larger family law system.  
In accordance with the recommendations of the Committee on the Rights of Child that States 
should ‘establish specialised legal aid support systems in order to provide children involved 
in administrative and judicial proceedings with qualified support and assistance.’377, it is 
therefore recommended  that there should be a support system created in family law matters 
between the presiding officer, the expert, the family advocate and the SLR. The various role-
players will work together to come to solution which is in the best interest of the child. What 
is essential is much stronger emphasis on the role of the presiding officer with regard to how 
the matter should be dealt with and children’s involvement in the matters. It is has been 
recognised that ‘the extent to which children’s voices are heard depends on the role the judge 
plays in determining how their views are received, weighed and taken into account.’378 
A family law team approach requires the team to co-operate in order to fulfil two main 
functions (1) determine the most appropriate procedure to provide this particular child the 
most appropriate opportunity to have his or her views heard and; (2) provide the judge with 
the relevant context to enable the judge to understand the reasons behind the child’s views 
and determine the due weight to be attached to the child’s view. The team should take an 
individualistic approach to all cases and decide in each matter what the most appropriate 
participation method is, which will ensure the child’s current views and the context for those 
                                                            
377 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, 43rd Session , “Speak, Participate and Decide – The 
Child’s Right to be Heard” , Day of General Discussion, 15 September 2006 
378 Cashmore and Parkinson (2007) 44. 
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views are put before the court. The chosen approach by the family law team should be guided 
by the wishes and characteristics of the particular child, the stage and type of the dispute 
(including the personalities of the parents), the personalities, skills and experience of the 
members of the family law team responsible for the case.
379
 
 
Word count: 35 097 
 
                                                            
379 Tapp (2006) 73.  
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